The purpose of this essay is to offer several hypotheses based on the concept of civilization and the conceptual scaffolding for the study of the cultural reality, proposed in the Spring 2024 CCR paper, regarding the three civilizations coexisting in the world today: the monotheistic, the Sinic, and the Indic. It introduces the modal dimensions along which civilizations may differ on the level of the individual mind — cognitive (pertaining both to the structure and contents of thought), moral, and emotional; and that of the society (separate institutions and institutional systems) and history.
Author Archives: gililiah
The Academic Question: Could American Research Universities Be Reformed and Should They Be?
By Liah Greenfeld
[A shorter version of this article was published as “How the ‘Social Sciences’ Killed Our Universities,” in Academic Questions, Summer 2025.]
About forty years ago I was writing a book, the goal of which was to explain the world in which we then lived. It focused on the major political players of the post WWII period and centuries before that (at least two but in some cases five): England/Britain, France, Russia/USSR, Germany, and the United States. At that time, three of these (the USA, Britain, and France) were the leading powers of the West, which engaged in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, while Germany was split between the Western and the Soviet spheres of influence. The West represented liberal democracy and the great moral value of individual freedom; the Soviet Union stood for socialism and communism, identified with the suppression of individual freedom and totalitarianism.
When the book was published in 1992, the Cold War was over. With the Soviet Union disintegrating, the West was triumphant, celebrating the end of the ideological strife which defined the politics (and with it much else) of the preceding forty-five years as “the end of history”; Germany reunified and became a liberal democracy in its entirety; and the world about which I wrote in the 1980s already began to transform. History did not end, but its direction definitely changed. As if being deprived of the enemy which mobilized its energies, keeping it in a battle-ready spirit and confident of its course, reduced its collective immunity, the West relaxed, turned inward, and lost its direction. No longer having its attention concentrated by the common outside threat, it let it wander from one lesser problem to another, bringing these inner and particular problems into view, disuniting liberal democratic communities, and making various publics in each of them increasingly dissatisfied both with the domestic situation of each and with the Western community, in general. Many of these problems were rather old but, previously eclipsed by exigencies of the Cold War, were now brought into focus. These were old abscesses that needed, but were never given, treatment. Others, however, were new, either created from scratch or brought about by new post-Cold War circumstances. In the past thirty – thirty-five years, they have been feeding on each other, tearing our world apart, undermining it, and destroying it from within.
American research universities – our national contribution to world science and higher education, imitated almost all over the globe – while not the only factor contributing to this moribund development, were undoubtedly the main powerful institution to do so. I noticed that something was awry with this institution a few years after coming to the United States in 1982. Twenty-eight years old and a newly-minted Israeli Ph. D., I came with my husband and an 18-months-old son, for a year’s post-doc at the University of Chicago, which due to circumstances not under my control turned into an immigration. Before arriving in Israel ten years previously, I grew up in the Soviet Union, and to my mind, the United States was what it was to all the freedom-starved Eastern Bloc’s intelligentsia: the Promised Land of the free, morally-upright people, a light onto the world. So, although this was an unanticipated development which dramatically changed all mine and my family’s plans for the future, I did not mind staying. I even thought myself lucky, since only three years later I found myself an Assistant Professor at the legendary Harvard University. And it is there where my disillusionment commenced.
A year after I started teaching at Harvard, in 1986, another female sociologist arrived at the illustrious institution. There was a lot of celebration on account of her joining of our faculty, and the reason for the celebration and for joining astonished the young idealistic me. It was not the quality of this sociologist’s work, but the fact that she was a she, a woman, female. Coming from Israel, which recently buried its long-term, very popular, and extremely consequential female prime minister, and where unmarried childless women served in the armed forces alongside men (only motherhood, not their sex as such, changing the nature of their rights and obligations), being a woman was a trivial circumstance for me. It certainly was no justification for offering someone a position in the most famous university of the free world, and it was simply peculiar to celebrate such an unjustified appointment. I did not have a crystal ball and, therefore, could not have been aware that a few decades later, such an appointment would not be possible – not because being a woman did not justify it, but because American universities would no longer know how to define a woman. In 1986 we have not as yet descended into such morass, and it was plain that my colleague (who was not a mother) was defined as a woman on the basis of, as we would say today, “ascription at birth,” that is, to call a spade a spade, the shape of her genitals. Granted, I was not able to appreciate then, in my early 30s, how simple and almost natural appointing a woman as a professor at a distinguished university because she was a woman would appear to me in the light of the academic madness with which I would be confronted in my advanced middle age. But at that time, I found genitals as the qualification for a university professorship shocking and revolting, troubled by the patent absurdity of both this appointment and the fanfare with which it was met. Because it was illogical, it was unjust, since justice reflects the logical consistency of our order. And because it was unjust, it was immoral, because morality, the ability to distinguish good from evil, or right from wrong implies the ability to separate what is just from what is unjust. Above all, I was flabbergasted by the lack of respect for logic at the university. Logic is the very foundation of science and humanistic scholarship. I began doubting that the American research university was the home of science and scholarship, which it was believed to be.
In the meantime, perestroika was underway in the Soviet Union and other people were beginning to notice that not all was right in American academia. As Mark Bauerlein reminded us very recently, the Culture Wars “broke out in the mid-1980s, on campus they took the form of the ‘Canon Wars,’ whose battlefield was the English syllabus.” The humanities as a whole were to pay the price. “At this point, English, history, philosophy, and foreign languages combined draw only four percent of the majors in the United States.”[1]
Then, already in 1987, the National Association of Scholars was founded. Its goal was to preserve “Western intellectual heritage,” but, as its original name, “The Campus Coalition for Democracy” indicated, its orientation was more civic than scholarly. The original leadership of the organization precociously perceived that the university – already then – posed a grave danger to the American way of life, no less. The motto of the NAS, “for reasoned scholarship in a free society,” professes the principle: free society needs reasoned scholarship.
In the ensuing decades this way of life was brought to near destruction. The university imposed on the society the disaster of the DEI which went against all the principles on which this country – and modern liberal democracy — was founded. It revived antisemitism in America – and all the Western world, making the “progressive,” “liberal” West the leader of all the retrograde, illiberal forces in the world, cynically, 1984-like, imposing on the free world, in the name of freedom and equality, a regime of suppression of freedom, of inequality, and of open racism. These trends – all coming from the university – appeared unstoppable. It took the unlikely victory of the candidate most detested by the university as President of the United States to restore, to those who already despaired, hope that they may be stopped. NAS President Peter Wood wrote early in March: “It is immensely encouraging to see state legislatures proposing and, in some cases, passing bills that would end “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI) indoctrination in public colleges and universities.”[2]
Equally encouraged, and fully in agreement with the civic position of the NAS and with its diagnosis of the problem: the university being the main agent of the diseased state of our society, I would like here to question the implicit causal analysis of both the NAS and the government – asking what in the university has made it an agent of civic destruction, why has it played this deleterious role. I shall suggest (1) that the American research university has had, from its birth, very little to do with “Western intellectual heritage,” if by this we mean “great books” and the propagation of values of liberal democracy; (2) that the reason for its formation was status-protection for a certain elite group losing its dominance; (3) that this group used (and abused) the authority of science that was emerging as the supreme source of moral and cultural authority, replacing its earlier sources, in particular religion; (4) that the adoption of the institution’s very name, “university,” was a travesty; (5) that its main contribution to society has been the channeling of money to the sciences, while profiting from this to advance the institution’s self-interest; (6) that while making this small contribution, it has caused the society, when all is said and done, a great damage; (7) that it cannot – and should not – be re-formed, but must be abolished and replaced by a new set of institutions, from which we shall be able to expect what we have mistakenly expected from our universities: the support of science and reasoned scholarship, and education of our youth.
Paradoxically, presented and generally believed to be the home for (exact and natural) science and (humanistic) scholarship, the American research university used these recognized fields of inquiry, which developed in Europe almost completely outside of university settings, for the benefit of, and to establish, a brand-new profession, which did not correspond to any area of study but was nevertheless named “social science.” The name was chosen because after the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, the prestige of science skyrocketed, while that of the church simultaneously dramatically decreased. The name “science” was a claim to authority, which only a philosopher of science, i.e., someone with a deep understanding of what science was (that is, at the time, very few people in the entire world) would be able to dispute. By successfully laying this claim, “social science” was able to arrogate to itself the right to preside over the education of the youth, previously belonging to the church.
It is important to remember that traditionally, universities were neither educational institutions nor the home of humanistic scholarship; they were religious institutions, to begin with, with time and change in historical circumstances expanding to become places of professional training for positions in the clergy, medicine, and law. “Liberal Arts,” a kind of general education for future clergymen, doctors, and lawyers, were added to these much later, already in modern times, acquiring importance, specifically in the German states, with Enlightenment and Romanticism, when the concept of elite education as Bildung became popular in aristocratic circles and high bureaucracy. The future “social scientists” indeed studied in German states and were influenced by ideas current there. (Germany, however, can hardly be taken as the paradigmatic example of Western intellectual heritage.)
I have studied the history of the universities, American universities, in particular, since the end of the last century and shall refer to my conclusions from these studies.[3] As I summarized in the relatively recent, thus late among these studies, lengthy 2020 essay on the social sciences for the Encyclopedia Britannica, American research universities were the creation of the post-Civil War business magnates – the new super-rich who appreciated the enormous possibilities science (physics and biology) opened for business and were willing to invest in its cultivation — and of the East-coast gentry, the scions of old families which formed the bulk of the colonial and pre-Civil War undifferentiated, mostly professional, but by default also cultural, elite. This elite was not intellectually sophisticated, was not much interested in science as progressive accumulation of reliable knowledge about empirical reality, and had no understanding or historical knowledge of the dramatic revolution in consciousness (ways of thinking) that made such accumulation possible. Its central concern was the change in the traditional structure of American society brought by the increasing immigration and, particularly, the rise (partly from among the new immigrants and generally from the less genteel strata of American society) of a new business elite – the powerful new rich, known among the gentry as “robber barons.” The gentry felt their position in society threatened and believed that great wealth, unconnected to the style of life which legitimated social status before the Civil War, was deleterious to the society as a whole and, concentrated in the hands of the few, made the rest of it poorer and created numerous social problems.
In 1865, some of the prominent members of this traditional elite formed in Boston the American Association for the Promotion of Social Science, the goal of which was “to aid the development of social science, and to guide the public mind to the best practical means of promoting the amendment of laws, the advancement of education, the prevention and repression of crime, the reformation of criminals, and the progress of public morality, the adoption of sanitary regulations, and the diffusion of sound principles on questions of economy, trade, and finance.” The Association, declared its constitution, “will give attention to pauperism, and the topics related thereto; including the responsibility of the well-endowed and successful, the wise and educated, the honest and respectable, for the failures of others. It will aim to bring together the various societies and individuals now interested in these objects, for the purpose of obtaining by discussion the real elements of truth; by which doubts are removed, conflicting opinions harmonized, and a common ground afforded for treating wisely the great social problems of the day.”
Rhetorically, this re-established the authority of the traditional elite, which the rise of the independent business elite undermined. Wisdom and education were equated with honesty and respectability, and wise and educated members of the Association, it was implied, were already in the possession of the social science, including the sound principles on questions of economy, trade, finance, and the responsibilities of successful businessmen. In this context, “science” was not the open-ended process of accumulation of objective knowledge about empirical reality by means of logically formulated conjectures subject to refutation by contradictory evidence. It was political advocacy by those with a special insight, capable of making real elements of truth to come out in discussion, i.e. science as an art, specifically, of persuasion: an ideology.
The preoccupations of “social science” so conceived ranged from “pork as an article of food” to management of insane asylums, but from the start two areas dominated: “economy, trade and finance,” from national debt to relations between labor and capital, which reflected the economic focus of the elite’s social criticism; and education, including the “relative value of classical and scientific instruction in schools and colleges.” Here “scientific instruction” referred to instruction in physical sciences (biology having barely begun), which was relatively new, while classical instruction was the instruction members of the American cultural elite received in their schools and colleges. This education was devalued by the power of very large amounts of money that could be achieved without any education at all. The traditional elite’s insistence on the social importance of such (non-scientific) education was connected to its need to protect its status.
Within a year AAPSS merged with the American Social Science Association, a subsidiary of the Massachusetts Board of Charities, also formed in 1865. The leading patrician reformers — its officers – included three future research university presidents who played a major role in the creation of these new organizational settings for the life of the mind, which would soon control it. Social scientists capitalized on the uncultured businessmen’s interest in natural science and harnessed this interest to their specific status concerns: offering their cooperation in developing institutions for the promotion of science, they established themselves as authorities over how far the definition of science would stretch. The first research university, Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, was established in 1876, when it was thoroughly in the interest of those who identified as “social scientists” – to start with, quite unthinkingly, without any consideration of what this implied – to be recognized as scientists, members, together with physicists and biologists, of the scientific profession.
Self-seeking concerns behind this interest in the name of science were evident in two developments which followed closely on the heels of the formation of the first research university: the division of the “social science” into “disciplines” and efforts to model these disciplines on physics, establishing as unquestionable the belief that what made science objective was quantification, which also was the essence of the scientific method, and that the authority of a discipline corresponded to the extent of the application of this method, that is, the volume of quantitative formulations, in it. The first “social science” to be institutionalized as an academic discipline within research universities was economic history. That this was history was probably related to the fact that many “social scientists” from patrician American families spent time in German universities, in whose liberal arts’ faculties history had already emerged as a highly respectable profession, encouraging these first American university professors without a particular interest to see themselves as historians. In its turn, the economic focus of the newly-minted historians reflected the old target of their social criticism.
Only eight years after the first research university was founded, in 1884, American historians, gathered for the first annual professional convention, formed a trade union: the American Historical Association. During its second annual meeting, in 1885, some of the historians left the AHA and formed the American Economic Association. Several years later, a group of the first American economists left the AEA and formed the American Political Science Association. And in 1905, some of these political scientists, who earlier identified as economists and before that considered themselves historians, quit APSA to form ASS – the American Sociological Society – the American Sociological Association of today. Thus, five years into the 20th century, an association of gentry activists and social critics affiliated with a charity board spawned four academic disciplines, splitting “social science” into history, economics, political science, and sociology.
This spontaneous fission was different from specialization in physics and biology. Scientific specialization was prompted by developments in the understanding of the subject matter: anomalies in earlier theories contradicted by evidence, the raising of new questions, the discovery of previously unknown causal factors. It accompanied the advancement of objective knowledge and contributed to its further progress. The break-up of the “social science” into separate disciplines, in distinction, reflected the desire to increase career opportunities. The cart was placed before the horse. The foundation of professional associations was the first step in the formation of the professions to find them useful. The existence of professional associations justified the establishment of university departments in which the declared but undefined professions would be practiced and new generations of professionals trained. This was an effective professionalization strategy, but it mostly contributed to bureaucratization and vested interests, not to the advancement of objective knowledge and understanding of the “social sciences” presumed subject — humanity.
The separate “disciplines” of economics, political science, and sociology – were to develop within this also nascent institutional environment, like them, in a large measure, brought into being by the desire of the traditional American elite to re-establish its political and cultural authority, but in principle established to promote science in the first place. The environment attracted to the new “social sciences” people actuated by three quite independent motives, which would throughout their existence confuse the identities and agenda of these disciplines. To begin with, the conviction of the original American “social scientists” that they, better than anyone else, knew how the society should be organized, that they were the experts on questions of general good and social justice and, as such, natural advisors to policy-makers and wielded moral authority, persisted when “social science” split into economics, political science, and sociology. All three disciplines continued to attract people who were interested not in understanding reality but in changing it, to paraphrase Marx’s famous thesis. However, authority no longer could be claimed on the basis of a genteel life-style. With science successfully competing with religion as the source of certain knowledge and even ultimate meaning, the emphasis in “social science” shifted to “science” and the word meant “like physics (and biology),” rather than any kind of knowledge. For those who wanted status, a career in science offered the best odds.
The desire to establish themselves as scientists was the main reason for the rise of the discipline of economics. The discipline was explicitly modeled on the recognized sciences. Economists-to-be knew that the sciences systematically advanced reliable knowledge, but had limited understanding why and how they did so. They wished to do in regard to society what physicists did in regard to matter and biologists in regard to life, and, from the outside it appeared that what these did was dealing in numbers and algorithms. The quantitative fetish has been characteristic of all three newborn “social sciences,” but economics went farthest in developing quantitative mannerisms (substituting the outward manner of expression for method). As professionalization strategy, this, again, proved very effective: these mannerisms made economics exclusive, a kind of a secret society with an esoteric language that nobody else understood, and established it as the queen of the social sciences. The reason for the exit of future political scientists from economics was the fact that these quasi-methodological considerations appeared to push the political aspirations of the “social scientists” into the background. In fact, they greatly contributed to the political influence of economics.
On their part, both political science and sociology, were also deeply preoccupied with their status as sciences: quantitative symbols of this status, which, remarkably, placed economists far above physicists and biologists as advisors to presidents, have retained their value throughout in them too, though never allowing either to achieve the level of authority enjoyed by economics. The cultivation of status symbols of science (the manners of expression which, for “social scientists” constituted science) allowed the new disciplines to see their history as the history of science – the story of progressive accumulation of objective knowledge on their subject matter and ever more accurate understanding of causal interrelationships among its constituent elements. Just like physics and biology, it has been since believed, social sciences continued and dramatically improved upon a long tradition of unsystematic (because not scientific) thought on their subjects. This narrative has persisted despite overwhelming contrary evidence, attracting to the economics, political science, and sociology, people actuated by the third motive – the actual interest in understanding the empirical human reality. Believing the narrative, they would eagerly invest in whatever methodological training their professors suggested and shrug off the latter’s ideological views as a personal matter.
In the meantime, psychology, always insistent that, focusing on the individual, it was unlike other “social sciences,” has largely reverted to its natural science roots, content to study animal brain and leave the riddle of the human mind to philosophers. Preoccupations of the “social sciences,” whatever these may be, are quite irrelevant to it. The discipline of history, almost immediately abandoned by those of its original members primarily interested in self-promotion, early opted out of the “social sciences” and joined the ranks of humanities, on the whole practicing scholarship for its own sake, rather than to lay claim to social authority. In anthropology, too, the authority of the profession and whether it be considered science or not has mattered far less than in the three core disciplines of the “social science” family, anthropologists finding sufficient satisfaction doing fieldwork in settings that hardly could have any bearing on their own lives. Similar to natural history before biology’s take-off, history, anthropology, and exceptional sociologists, political scientists, and economists have certainly added valuable information to the common stores of knowledge about humanity, but this information, not being science, cannot on its own spur development and, therefore, does not lead to progress in our understanding. Science is essentially a collective continuous enterprise, impossible without certain institutional conditions – very specific ways of thinking and acting – fundamentally different from the ones that currently exist in research universities in-so-far as the subject of humanity is concerned. Contributions of these scholars can be likened to insights of exceptional individuals, capturing one or another aspect of material or organic reality before the emergence of physics and biology: they do not build up. Their significance is limited to cultural and historical moments of public interest in particular subjects they happen to treat.
Public interests change with the change in historical circumstances, causing “social sciences” to switch directions: fashionable subjects and “theories” suddenly fall out of favor and new ones as suddenly acquire it, preventing all cumulative development. WWII and Cold War for several decades between 1940s and 1980s made totalitarianism a major focus in political science and inspired in it the creation of the subdiscipline of Sovietology. The break-up of the Soviet Union deprived both of their relevance to policy makers and forced hundreds of political scientists to look for another field of expertise, giving rise to nationalism studies, transition studies, democratization studies, global studies, allowing the newly-minted experts to pronounce with authority on subjects of which they, by definition, knew nothing. The ground-swell of discontent with the unfulfilled promise of equality, made legitimate in the context of guilt and disorientation caused by the Holocaust, has shifted the ideology of social justice from preoccupation with economic structures (capitalism, class) to preoccupation with identity (race, gender, sexual orientation), affecting, in particular, sociology. The discreditation of Marxism with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe reinforced this ideological re-orientation: American (and then international) sociology has become the science of essentialist, because inherent in groups’ very being, inequalities, inequality, the opposite of equality and emphatically unjust, replacing the long-time staple of sociological research, stratification. As a science, the possessor of objective knowledge, it claims the authority to discern such inequalities and provide leadership in their elimination. Feminist, queer, and other subaltern narratives, regularly included in “social sciences” theory syllabi, prescribe how human reality should be interpreted.
These theories inspired the foundation of new programs and departments of African-American, Latinx, Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, which have been added to the Divisions of the Social Sciences across the United States. These programs and departments broaden career opportunities for sociologists, political scientists, historians, and, to a lesser extent, other disciplines in social sciences and humanities and, for this reason, are considered interdisciplinary. They broaden career opportunities, in particular, for practitioners of these disciplines who represent groups on which the new programs and departments focus, thereby contributing to the racial and sexual “diversity” of the universities. With racial and sexual diversity (as promoting group equality) on top of the articulated political agenda outside of academia, this increased “diversity” of the social sciences makes the universities politically dependent on them. It allows them to hold their own at the time when STEM disciplines, which fail to attract women and, apart from Jews and South-East Asians, minorities in sufficient numbers, attract most outside funding, and humanities, which have neither economic nor political utility, face the possibility of attrition. The focus on essentialist inequality in “social science” naturally leads to the institutionalization of DEI throughout the university and outside it. Thus, the university changes society.
“Social sciences” actively contribute to the change of interests in the larger society. Then, claiming that their focus is not their own but shifts in accordance with the changing interests outside the university, they greatly reinforce these outside interests by creating the language in which to express them and placing behind them the authority of science – presenting them as objective and “true.” The natural correspondence between outside social interests and self-interests of social science professions allows social sciences to wield tremendous influence, directly affecting the legislative process, jurisprudence, the media, primary and secondary education, and politics in the United States (and therefore, to different extents, the rest of the world). Within the long tradition of Western social thought, “social sciences” stand out as one of the most powerful social forces all the while despite having zero intellectual significance. [4]
It is the institutionalization of a fundamentally ideological project – the very opposite of science — as science within the framework of American research (scientific!) universities that has been steadily undermining, corrupting, education, scholarship, and science itself within our society which in the last three decades it turned into an Orwellian nightmare. As the American research university was created to give a home to this ideological project, its reform would imply essentially gutting it – taking out its very heart and brain – killing it, in other words. Attacking DEI and calling the university to account for its antisemitism, while immensely encouraging, indeed, for people losing all hope in their society’s ability to reassert its values, are no more than surface measures that may be likened to attempts to cure metastasizing cancer by compresses applied to resulting skin lesions. The university cannot be reformed, it must be abolished and replaced by a set of new institutions.
This, however, is doable. Only the will to accomplish it is required. The “social sciences” are an enormous fraud perpetrated on our society. They are also the only beneficiary of our university system. Only the interests of the “social sciences” are served by the enormous ever-growing bureaucracies, in turn dependent on the “social sciences” for their self-perpetuation. Nobody but the “social sciences” and the bureaucracies needs them. For all the other constituents of the university — professional schools, sciences, and humanities – the unification in its framework, is counterproductive. All of these can exist perfectly in independent institutions, before the arrival of American research universities called “institutes” in Europe: Institutes of Medicine, Institutes of Law, Institutes of Engineering, Research Institutes in Physics, Mathematics, History, Literature, or Classics, separate Schools of Theology – all providing higher education and training for professionals in their particular fields. The universities should be disbanded and their professional schools and science and humanities departments reorganized in such independent institutes. To these should be added Pedagogical Institutes (Normal Schools), preparing school-teachers, from general elementary teachers to teachers of particular disciplines in middle and upper classes, professionals equipped with knowledge of child and adolescent psychology, familiarity with best pedagogical practices, and thorough understanding of the disciplines they are to teach. General education should be provided American children at school; they should arrive at the threshold of their adult lives and whatever continued education or training they choose to acquire as fundamentally and roundly educated people. All these specialized institutes can occupy the existing facilities and keep institutional memory using such names as Harvard Institute of Medicine, Harvard Institute of Physics or Slavic Literatures, Chicago Quad Pedagogical Institute, Chicago Quad Institute of Biology, etc., but without overarching bureaucracies, starting with presidents paid enormous salaries for raising funds to get paid even more.
The idea of “social science” emerged in Europe in the 1840s as the idea for a science focused on humanity as a reality of its own kind in which particular form of causality operated, strictly analogical to physics as the science of matter and biology as the science of life (though the latter was not yet born, but, like science of humanity, only imagined). As the understanding of the special nature of humanity was as yet lacking, the imagined science of humanity was misnamed, and the misnomer stuck, misleading the first actual practitioners of this (like physics and biology) general science, Durkheim in France and Weber in Germany. Needless to say, humanity is a fascinating and for us, humans, arguably the most important reality, and it would be wonderful to have a special science exploring and generating objective knowledge regarding it. But American “social science” was not inspired by this idea. There is no way of changing it so as to make it, as it now exists, re-oriented to this very worthy project. To develop the science of humanity, it has to be started anew – in a separate Institute of its own.
As to the existing “social sciences,” their departments, artificial to begin with, should be disbanded together with the research universities created for their institutionalization, or allowed to die naturally during the period of reorganization, without new intakes of students, hires, and promotions, and with the senior faculty encouraged to retire.
[1] Mark Bauerlein, “How Humanities Professors Got Marginalized,” Newsletter of the James D. Martin Center for Academic Renewal, March 12, 2025.
[2] Peter W. Wood, “Institutions Won’t Cure Themselves – That’s Why Anti-DEI Legislation is Necessary,” Minding the Campus, March 3, 2025.
[3] These conclusions were published, first, in my 2001 book The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth, Harvard University Press, in regard to the emergence of the discipline of economics in the United States specifically; then in a paper dealing with the sources of that discipline in Europe as well, “How Economics Became a Science: A Surprising Career of a Model Discipline,” in Amanda Anderson and J. Valente (eds.), Disciplinarity at the Fin de Siecle, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, pp. 87-125. They were developed to account for some counterproductive implications of the structure of American research universities in a 2012 essay, “American Universities and the Stagnation of Knowledge,” in Greenfeld (ed.), The Idea(l)s of Joseph Ben-David: The Scientist’s Role and Centers of Learning Revisited, Transaction Publishers and another one, focusing on the deleterious effects of American universities on liberal democracy, “Back to 1984: The Role of American Universities in Dismantling Liberal Democracy,” Society, 53(4), 2016, pp. 368-374. The latest in this series was my 2020 commissioned contribution of a major new section to Encyclopedia Britannica’s article on Social Science: “Social Science: History, Disciplines, and Facts” (around 20,000 words) https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-science, on which I rely for the most part in the current paper.
[4] The preceding discussion (pp. 7—17) does not exactly quote but generally relies on parts of my essay for Britannica mentioned above.
Online Lecture for IIT, Indore, India
Abstract: The lecture will discuss Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience – the concluding volume of Liah Greenfeld’s nationalism trilogy. It will place the book within the framework of human science, defining humanity as an empirical reality of its own kind and locating it among other realities (the material – matter, studied by physics, and the organic – life, studied by biology) shaping our common existential experience. It will then apply the fundamental concepts of symbols, mind, and culture to the empirical focus of the book: the functional mental illnesses of major depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia – all severe medical diseases of unknown organic origin, causing great suffering and not infrequently leading to the lethal outcome – interpreting them as symbolic, mental, cultural phenomena. This will explain these diseases causally, connecting them and the increase in their rates to the dynamics of modern culture and, specifically, nationalism.
Preface to the Chinese Translation of Mind, Modernity, Madness
The sentiment that I would like to express above all others in the Preface to the Chinese edition of the third volume of my nationalism trilogy, Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience, translated into Chinese as 心智、现代性、疯癫: 文化对人类经验的影响, is deep gratitude to the Chinese public (including my readers, publishers, and, in the first place, translators) for their intellectual openness and interest. Among Western educated strata such intellectual openness and interest, i.e., openness and interest to new ideas and unorthodox interpretation of reality, however closely corresponding to actual facts, in the last three decades have been lost. Western societies are not at this moment societies conducive to free inquiry, in which science, especially social science, can flourish. And while Chinese students still flock to Western universities in search of inspiration, they may be better off staying at home and turning for enlightenment to their own classics.
Certainly, I cannot imagine a group of Western scholars from different universities and academic disciplines out of their own accord and desire to share with others a scholarly work they believe important combining into a team of translators and working for over nine years in their private time, without any remuneration, to render it in a language other than the one in which it was written. But this is what the translators of this book into Chinese did. In the 5 centuries of their hegemony Western societies contributed to humanity the sciences, first physics, the science of matter, and then biology, the science of life. A science of humanity – an honest, systematic, logically based and empirically tested exploration of perhaps the most significant aspect of empirical reality for all of us, which can produce objective knowledge about, and improve our common understanding of it — is not among the West’s legacies, for the so-called “social sciences” which stand for such a science never advanced beyond the pre-scientific stage of data collection and empty theorizing. Now that the Western world has exhausted its creativity, it is up to the other civilizations, the Chinese, first of all, to establish such a science. This book suggests the way to do it. Its translation into Chinese, therefore, is essential for a much larger and more consequential project, and the work of its selfless translators deserves more than my personal gratitude.
The translation of Mind, Modernity, Madness was an exceptionally difficult job. Linguistic history provided a considerable portion of the book’s empirical material, while its novel argument required a very careful conceptualization, that is, meticulous, even vigilant, work with words. There was often no ready Chinese vocabulary to accurately convey particular expressions and turns of phrase in their historical contexts and the intended meanings of scrupulously chosen terms in the context of the argument. Translators constantly faced hard choices none of which often was good.
One central example will suffice. I chose the word “madness” for the title because this 16th century invention, a neologism, marked the addition to the English semantic space of a newly significant phenomenon: the functional mental illness which would later be called “depression,” “bipolar disorder,” and “schizophrenia.” Unlike numerous well-known mental illnesses, this new illness named “madness,” while similar in its presentation to some, was not related to age or infectious diseases and fever, and was chronic, making those who suffered from it “mad” for life. Individual cases of this disease could be found in history, but, being very rare, exceptional, did not require a name. It was the fact that suddenly the rate of its incidence and prevalence dramatically increased that made it a part of the English experience and demanded a new term to designate it.
The nature of the mental illness called in English “madness” was unknown when the term appeared. Some early observers thought of it as a disease of the body (“fengdian” — 疯癫 – in Chinese) and some as the disease of the spirit (which in Chinese would be rendered as “xinji” — 心疾). But no existing word in any language could be translated accurately as “madness” because this new word captured not the nature of the new noticeable disease but the experience of noticing – the expansion of the semantic space in England at a particular point in its history.
In the book, I dwelt in detail on the context in which the word “madness” was created and the specificity of the experience that led to its creation. I also showed how the lack of awareness of this experience resulted in the equation of “madness” with the French much older “folie,” conventionally used in France for “weak-mindedness,” which, in turn, both misled the emerging psychiatry and obfuscated the history of mental illness, contributing greatly to the misunderstanding of depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia and the inability of the Western psychiatric establishment to arrest the epidemic of mental illness at present hitting Western societies.
Nothing but extended explanations of terms can assure the perfect accuracy of translation: the contexts in which words emerge and are used are often as important for the transmission of meanings as the words themselves. Languages are not systems of interchangeable signs signifying universal meanings, they carry with them a huge cultural baggage rarely suggested by the vocabularies and reflecting the different historical experiences of different cultures. They are mutually translatable only to a limited extent. Translators have to do with the linguistic resources they have, they must resign themselves to the inherent inability of translation to transmit the intended meanings of the original with perfect accuracy.
The reader should keep this in mind. The central subject of this book is the cultural process. The cultural process is the most complex aspect of our reality, most difficult to understand – which, however, makes its understanding the most rewarding. The inevitable imperfection of translation is a reflection of the complexity of the cultural process. The reader cannot consume this text passively but is required to participate in the translators’ work, add to it, read deeply, thinking, being aware of the pitfalls of simple substitution of words in one language for those in another.
This could be too demanding for a Western audience. But it is not, I am sure, for the Chinese. You are carrying in your minds 5000 years of a great civilization. No mental work is above what you can do.

Faculti Interview: A New Explanation of Antisemitism
Liah Greenfeld interview with Faculti, September 25, 2024
https://faculti.net/a-new-explanation-of-antisemitism-jew-hatred-as-a-civilisational-phenomenon/
discussing Greenfeld’s article “A new explanation of antisemitism: Jew hatred as a civilizational phenomenon,” Israel Affairs, July 2024
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13537121.2024.2367877
How does the article link the borrowed monotheism of Christianity and Islam to the psychological dynamics of envy and inferiority complex toward Jews?
Imagine what is to know that you are obliged for God who gives meaning to your life and defines your identity to someone else. The identity of the borrower by definition references the lender and is not self-sufficient. Judaism is the foundation of the monotheistic civilization. The One God billions of Christians and Muslims worship is the Jewish God, the God of the Hebrew Bible, the Creator of and the central participant in the history of the Jewish people it depicts. (This is explicitly recognized in the Christian and Muslim Holy Scriptures.) The attention of Christians and Muslims is of necessity fixed on Jews; their identity (as Christians and as Muslims) is not self-sufficient, it depends on a justification of their separation from Jews, on explaining why they (Christians and Muslims) – believers as they are in the Jewish God – are not Jews themselves.
The psychological problem in which Christianity and Islam find themselves as a necessary result of their acceptance of Jewish monotheism is dramatically magnified by to them undeniable God’s choice of the Jews as His own people far ahead and above them. They know that, in the eyes of God, they are inferior to the Jews. God’s obvious preference forever replays the parable of Cain and Abel for Christians and Muslims: they forever envy the Jews this preference. Indeed, this is a sibling rivalry of sorts, on a very large scale: a futile and therefore endless competition for the love of the supremely important parent, once and for all given to the eldest child.
The very fact of borrowing God implies that the Jews relationship with God is enviable, that the Jews are envied for having this relationship and that they are freely chosen as a model, an object of admiration deserving of imitation. Originally, therefore, the borrowers believe the Jews to be superior to themselves – and themselves, naturally, inferior to the Jews and in need of becoming like them – but they are certain that they would a) soon become equal to, if not better than, the Jews (as more sincere, more dedicated believers in Jewish God, that is, as better Jews) and b) be admired by Jews for their efforts on behalf of Jewish God. This optimistic anticipation is not fulfilled: Jews never thought much of the borrowers’ efforts. Thus, the borrowers were left with the nagging sense of the inerasable superiority of their model and insupportable, humiliating suspicion of their own permanent inferiority.
Under this emotional distress their initial admiration of the Jews as the model gave way to a much less benign sentiment of envy – existential envy, that is, the envy of the Jews’ existential significance which, by comparison, deprives the borrowers’ very existence of value. And this transforms the temporary sense of inferiority into the self-destabilizing complex, a psychopathology.
What do those concepts mean in this context?
In this context, these concepts (I suppose you refer to the existential envy and complex of inferiority vis-à-vis the Jews?) refer to – and explain — the continuous targeted hatred of the Jews, that is, antisemitism: they explain why there is antisemitism. Existential envy is necessarily connected to the complex of inferiority, i.e., the loathing of one’s own (individual or collective) self. A powerful irritant, constantly rekindled by reminders of the model’s (in this context, Jews) superiority, it poisons from within, festers, and turns to hatred. This leads to the transformation of the model (in this context, the Jews) into the anti-model, ascribing to them as many vices as the borrowers previously discerned in them virtues and making the struggle against them a central orientation of their consciousness.
A continuously targeted hatred, cutting through particular historical contexts, while, perhaps, triggered by historical contexts, is caused, and must be fully explained, psychologically. Though always personally experienced, a continuous hatred which lasts for generations cannot be related to personal grievances or offences by particular individuals; it must derive from a grievance of a group against another group. It is necessarily irrational, not provoked by the threat to objective, i.e., actually entertained and empirically provable interests and attempts to realize them, because such interests change from generation to generation, as do the agents who oppose them. Motivated continuously and irrespective of the specific historical context by the sense of inferiority to Jews, existential envy of them, in contrast to common forms of hostility to the out-group, which are always context-dependent, antisemitism is irrational. As such it emerges only with the spread of Christianity beyond its original Jewish converts. Antisemitism does not result from any declared political (or economic) interest; the interest it expresses cannot be declared, because its very acknowledgment would prevent its realization (indeed, very often antisemitism goes against the antisemites’ declared interests): it is a way to assuage the pain of the complex of inferiority which necessarily arises from comparing the antisemite’s community (religious or political) to the Jews, a form of self-therapy which won’t work if one understands its psychological roots.
How do these dynamics contribute to the development of antisemitic tropes within these religious communities?
Only the small theologically-literate thinking elite experienced personally the existential envy of the Jews and suffered from the complex of inferiority necessarily related to it. This was not the problem affecting the majority of Christians and Muslims. But this elite expressed the hatred produced by their envy and inferiority in holy scriptures and preaching and, while doing so, created tropes – the most important instrument of institutionalization. Tropes are constantly repeated narrative conventions, acquired with language as fully formed habits of thought with corresponding emotional attitudes. The knowledge of a trope is certain but implicit, like the knowledge of words in the mother-tongue. And, as one does not give any thought to common words while using them, so one does not give any self-conscious thought to a trope which is deployed. On the neurological level, therefore, a trope exists in the brain of the member of a culture in its original etymological sense of a (beaten) path, an established neural pathway. Tropes reduce complex symbolic messages to signs which require no interpretation: both their significance and reactions to them, i.e., both the stimulus and response, become automatic. Discouraging explicit thinking, tropes are likely to rely on the systems and mechanisms of implicit, long-term, consolidated memory. Neurologically, they are imbedded deeper in the brain than other linguistic devices. Deeply embedded but not consciously thought about ways of thinking, and therefore acting, they carry on social institutions. Whenever we speak of systemic or institutionalized this or that (e. g., in the USA, we often speak of institutionalized racism), we do in fact speak of tropes which define our subconscious – i.e., not explicit – attitudes, attitudes we would in many cases explicitly deny, if asked point blank whether we subscribe to them. The longer an attitude is transmitted through tropes, the deeper its institutionalization goes. Within our, monotheistic, civilization antisemitism is the deepest embedded – the oldest, the strongest – institution. Most of my article actually focuses on the development of antisemitic tropes in Christianity and Islam.
How do these narratives influence the consciousness and attitudes of the general population toward Jews in societies shaped by these monotheistic traditions?
Antisemitism first appeared in the Christian polemics ‘adversus Iudaeos’ – “against the Jews”; this was, in fact, its first name. ‘Polemic’ means ‘war’ (from the Greek polemos), thus ‘adversus Iudaeos’ polemic clearly and openly announces itself as ‘war against the Jews’. Given that ways of acting by and large follow the ways of thinking, it can be logically deduced that this rhetorical war directly led to the practical one – discriminatory legislation, violence, etc.
“War against the Jews” was the main preoccupation of the early Christian theology. Thus, the history of early Christian thought, the tremendously important centuries between the 2nd and the 7th centuries AD, is in effect a history of antisemitism. If Jew-hatred is not the only aspect of Christian theology of this formative period, it is undoubtedly its central aspect. And it remains at least a central aspect of Christian thought for another 5-6 centuries after that. The greatest Christian theologians (including St. Augustine in the 4th century, St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th) participate in the development of explicit antisemitism — a thousand-year-long continuous labor by the best minds and the most authoritative cultural figures of a millennium, by preachers and teachers of the largely illiterate masses for whom they constituted the only source of knowledge.
None of the Christian antisemitic tropes has been of a greater moment than that of Jews as the killers of Christ. This racist and irrational image which justified every Jewish massacre in Christian and post-Christian Europe, including to a very large extent the Holocaust, has proved ineradicable. In 1965, the Catholic Church, recognizing the contribution of this notion to the Holocaust renounced the idea of Jewish collective guilt transmitted from generation to generation by blood. But, as a scholar commented on the Second Vatican Council, ‘so deeply has this portrayal of the Jew penetrated Christian thought’, [Jeremy Cohen[i] writes,] ‘that [the curia] encountered more than token resistance at the Second Vatican Council…; even in the aftermath of the council, the notion of collective guilt [for deicide] continues to appear in contemporary Christian scholarship, both Catholic and Protestant’. And the Papal renunciation made very little impression on the general population: a one-time decree from above, however authoritative, proved no match for the attitude institutionalized for 2000 years, a trope deeply embedded in people’s brains.
Similarly, Islamic antisemitism was born together with Islam. In fact, it came into the world complete in the form that it is to keep forever, because it was a part of divine revelation in the Quran. Therefore, it was from the beginning institutionalized. As soon as the religion of Islam was preached, expressions of Islamic antisemitism became tropes. Coming directly from God, the Quran cannot be doubted, questioned, or innovated upon. It is absolutely true in its contents as well as form – a trope in its entirety – and can be interpreted only in the way of endless repetition and application to new situations.
As we are reminded by the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University – the equivalent of the Pope in Sunni Islam – Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, more than one-third of the Quran is devoted to the Jews. Jews are the supreme preoccupation of God himself. The antisemitism in ‘Allah’s book’ is reinforced in the overlapping canonical hadith (stories about Muhammad) and sira (Muhammad’s biographies).
Why are antisemitic traditions notably absent in non-monotheistic societies such as China and India?
Antisemitism is a product of borrowed monotheism. Without the psychological dynamic set off by the borrowing of God, antisemitism would not exist. Therefore, there are no native antisemitic traditions in non-monotheistic civilizations. In fact, and throughout their very long histories these civilizations manifest remarkably little awareness of Jews altogether. Our, monotheistic, civilization, in both its Christian and post-Christian, and its Muslim and post-Muslim halves, in distinction, is fixated on the Jews, for reasons that we talked about. It is because this very absence of indigenous antisemitism and widespread interest in Jews in Sinic and Indic civilizations, compared to their ubiquity across the many societies and historical periods in the monotheistic civilization that a comparison with these other two civilizations existing now in the world prompts us to connect monotheism and antisemitism, making possible finally and for the first time in history a systematic analysis and explanation of antisemitism.
Wrap up with conclusions, implications and areas of future research.
Here one should probably focus on the practical conclusions and implications. Antisemitism is the oldest, most entrenched institution, that is, established way of thinking and acting, in our civilization; throughout the last 2000 years it has been the most common motive behind group violence, whether domestic or interpolitical, that is, the most common cause of political conflict, both domestic and that between polities. It lies behind the greatest crime against humanity in history. Just within the last century, within living memory, it caused a World War and it is quite likely to cause another World War right now.
Without understanding the reasons for the existence of antisemitism we, obviously, have not been able to fight it effectively. Now that we understand these reasons we have a chance to do so. We must reveal these reasons – again and again – both to the antisemites and to those who are not antisemites – and to the latter both in our own civilization and in the Chinese and Indian ones. We must drum it into the brains of humanity, that is, make it a trope, that behind antisemitism lie the complex of inferiority and existential envy, that, in other words, antisemitism is the attitude of people who know themselves to be inferior and envious, which means, of objectively inferior and envious people. No doubt, members of the other civilizations, usually inclined to look up to ours, would be interested to know that a very large segment of the monotheistic population consists of inferior and envious people. This knowledge, and the knowledge that this knowledge is available to other civilizations, would surely make the non-antisemites in our civilization ashamed of antisemitism, eager to protect our civilization from this shame and the contempt of other civilizations, and perhaps at last actively turn against antisemites in our midst. Perhaps, even more important, understanding that antisemitism is caused by the complex of inferiority and existential envy would make antisemites ashamed of antisemitism and change themselves.
[i] Cohen, “The Jews,” 1–27; the discussion of the transformation of the “ignorance” tradition into one of “intentionality” relies on this text and all the respective quotations are from it.
The Rise of China and the Concept of Civilization
The paper argues that the rise of China to a position of prominence in the contemporary world offers Western scholars a greatly expanded comparative perspective and, thus, an opportunity to re-assess their fundamental view of social reality. This comparative perspective draws attention to supra-national cultural unities, “civilizations,” first suggested by both Durkheim and Weber.
There are deficiencies in the current understanding of “civilization” in the social science literature, among others exemplified by “civilizational analysis,” and so this paper proposes a new concept which adds to the conceptual apparatus of sociological theory a new — fully independent of others — variant of the cultural process.
This independence makes distinctions between civilizations the root cause of socio-cultural diversity. Combined with the idea of humanity as a culturally constituted reality sui generis, this concept allows the construction of the theoretical scaffolding necessary for systematic cross-civilizational comparison and comprehensive understanding of social life.
Greenfeld, Liah (2024) “The Rise of China and the Concept of Civilization: Constructing Conceptual Apparatus for Cross-Civilizational Comparisons,” Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 90: No. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol90/iss1/4
