Speakers in order of appearance: Mark Simes, Francesco Duina, Michael Arellano, David Barron, Edward Gormbley, Jonathan Eastwood, Peter Baehr, Chandler Rosenberger, James Stergios.
Text of Memorial Lecture:
Unconventionality in Greenfeld’s Thought
Francesco Duina
Charles A. Dana Professor of Sociology and European Studies
Bates College (USA)
Liah Greenfeld Memorial Lecture
Boston University
Sep 1, 2026
Hello everyone.
Thank you, Gil, for asking me to share my reflections on Liah, her work, and how consequential that work has been for me and – I am sure – for everyone else who is here, is following online, or is simply one of the many thousands who have read her work, listened to her lectures, or have been exposed to her thinking in some other way.
And thank you, Mark, for managing this event. It’s very good to be here, together.
I will do something that is a bit unusual for me – I will read my remarks. I just want to ensure that I say with some precision what I wish to share.
We are all here because of what Liah meant to us. We are here to honor her as a mentor, a passionate thinker, a major reference point in our own ways of looking at the world, a collaborator (for some of us), and a friend. Some of us met her only recently. Others were lucky to meet her a long time ago. I, for one, met her in the fall of 1991. She was the classical sociological theory professor in my first year of the PhD program at Harvard. Regardless of how long we may have known her, all of us – if I may speak on behalf of everyone – hold her in a particular place in our minds and hearts.
There is of course no way I can cover in the time I have today all that could be said about her contributions. On the one hand, this is because of the sheer volume of that work. There is so much there, and it was in fact very hard to keep up with her! She was productive until she left us – with her new ideas about civilizations yet becoming another set of profound concepts that called for serious attention. I know that I have focused on and digested over the decades only certain aspects of her thinking. Many of you have probably zeroed in on other aspects.
It is also impossible to say all that could be said about her work because she affected her students and readers in multiple and different ways. Even when we took the same things under consideration, I sense that each of us processed her ideas a bit differently. I think this is because they were often not simply academic points: they were worldviews – or derivations of worldviews … and these required much reflection. It seems to me, in other words, that for many of us her thinking influenced us academically but also personally. And so it ‘fragments’, so to speak, in many different ways and patterns.
So, I need to be selective. And I hope what I have to say today resonates with you.
I am going to focus my remarks on a dimension of her work that I think most of us are aware of but perhaps have not necessarily contemplated sufficiently as something that is consistent throughout, and central to, her work: the unconventional nature of her thinking. I will discuss this point in some detail and then conclude with reflections on methods and practical applications.
Let me preface, though, what I will say about her unconventionality by saying something about the breadth, in terms of objects of analysis, of Liah’s work. It shows an almost unparalleled coverage of themes and empirical levels – from the very macro to the very micro. Hence, she produced seminal contributions to the study of empires, globalization, states in history, nationalism, economic systems, the arts, religions, groups and organizations, terrorism, animals and humans, the social sciences, science in general, mental illnesses, the mind, emotions, and more. Most recently, as already noted, she had turned her attention to civilizations (Greenfeld, 2016, 2025).
I mean, a sort of table of contents a-la- Weber’s two volumes of Economy and Society comes to mind (!) – for those of you who know it.
Let me also preface my comments on her unconventionality by saying something about the inspirational qualities of her work. Reading Liah’s writing and listening to her presentations were, and continue to be, moving experiences. Even just thinking about her puts me in a different mindset and a special intellectual space. In any case, open any one of her works: It is easy to feel swept-away by the arguments and scope of thought. There is a sense of intellectual sublimity. Countless pages will therefore be devoted to her various arguments and claims. Suffice it to say that, according to Google Scholar, her Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity alone has already been cited over 6,000 times (Greenfeld, 1992). Much more is surely to come.
Inspiration came as well from being her student, of course. As a young graduate student in her theory seminar in the Fall of 1991, I often had the feeling of walking away from our meetings as if I were floating three feet off the ground. She transported us to a new, wonderful, and suspended place – not unlike a charismatic leader, in Max Weber’s terms (Weber, 1978). When I recently mentioned to a close friend of mine who was in that seminar and who I believe might be online now, that we would be having this memorial and I would be sharing my reflections with you, he urged me to mention our theory class: “she brought,” he told me, “a powerful and compelling speaking style and, if you showed up and engaged seriously, a powerful and compelling listening style that elevated her students. It elevated us.”
My friend is right, of course: she spoke to us but she also listened – really listened. Clearly, nearly 35 years have past, but her mind and passion are as vivid to us as ever. If you were one of her students or simply had the chance to engage seriously with her (as I am sure all of you have), I am certain you have similar memories.
So, with this said, what about the counterintuitive nature of her claims – as we consider her opus? I am going to identify several such claims but will state immediately what they share: unorthodoxy with respect to established and often canonical perspectives, and therefore the demand that we rethink much of what we have thought not only about existing scholarship but the way the social world works (Greenfeld, 1992, 2013a). We thought we knew something, and that certain issues were pretty much settled.
Liah consistently forced us to pause and reassess – usually with a relentless logic that left us scratching our heads. We were often stunned by what she proposed, unsure if it in fact could possibly be all correct, and yet uncertain as to where to look for possible missteps that might suggest she was in fact wrong and perhaps even hoping in some ways that, no, we did not need to expand our minds as much as she was asking us to do. This, I think, was a key driver of the inspiring qualities of her work.
Let me begin, then, with the first set of such claims – made as parts of her most well-known theses. Capitalism comes from nationalism and not the other way around (Greenfeld, 2001, 2016). Nor, therefore, does capitalism come from the Protestant mindset, as Weber had claimed (Weber, 2001). Secularism also comes from nationalism (Greenfeld, 1992, 2016). And thus modern science is only possible within nationalism, both because nationalism implies secularism but also because nations rely on science to compete with each other (Greenfeld, 2006, 2016). These are wide-sweeping statements that are, when first encountered, puzzling and difficult to grasp. They ask us to revisit our convictions about history and how the world works.
More broadly, nationalism is responsible for the modern collective (as well as individual) experience of life. Émile Durkheim was wrong when thinking that organic solidarity based on the division of labor was the cultural (and moral) glue that held people together in modernity (Greenfeld, 1992, 2018). Liah did not dismiss Durkheim as a whole of course: she agreed with him that the social world is cultural in the first instance. The issue is that Durkheim focused on the wrong cultural element, giving it too much importance.
Those familiar with his Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim, 1984) probably will admit to having doubted, at least to some degree, the validity of his arguments that such division had powerful integrative effects on society’s members as they supposedly shared an awareness of their mutual dependence. Liah opened the door wide open to a full reevaluation of one of the most sacred books in the sociological tradition.
Following the same thread, Liah stressed that human beings as members of society were never seen as equal until modernity (Greenfeld 1992, 2013a) – that is, until nationalism. And the switch to equality occurred because of a historical accident: the War of the Roses of 1455-1487 in England, with the resulting wiping out of the nobility, uplifting of every English person into the new social contract being forged, and granting of dignity to each English person. The event, Liah argued, completely (a favorite word of hers, that she usually applied to how some other thinker was wrong!) changed how people would perceive themselves, others, and much else (Greenfeld, 2013a).
This means that our current beliefs in universal equality, normally presented as objectively valid beyond question, are socially constructed and, in historical terms, rather odd (or, as she would put it, accidental). Such a stance undermines directly the premise of essentially every modern nation’s constitution, the many international agreements celebrating the equality of all human beings, and pretty much what many people think is a self-evident truth. Thus, the implied possibility that we may in fact not be equal in many respects upset quite a few people … let’s just say that she was not very PC at a time when being PC was very much in vogue.
But if you follow it, the argument can actually help us appreciate the uniqueness of the modern individual experience: as she repeatedly put it, most human beings in history lacked any sense of self-worth (dignity) and what they experience today is therefore unprecedented (Greenfeld, 2016). Importantly, that experience extends to a significant number of emotions and states of mind that, prior to nationalism, Liah again contended (with another installment of originality) did not exist.
Thus consider mental illnesses. Nationalism is the context in which illnesses such as schizophrenia and manic-depressive disorders are possible (Greenfeld, 2013a). The reason becomes clear once grasped: the fundamental equality presupposed by nationalism puts all the pressure on the individual for their life trajectories. No longer do class, caste, or other broader social categories predestine one to a defined path.
The future is wide open, and one can either succeed or fail. The pressures are accordingly enormous and fall on one’s shoulders, and not everyone can manage this (Greenfeld, 2013a). But, when first presented, the idea that nationalism could be responsible for a person’s anxieties seems far-fetched and impossible. The reactions from the medical and social scientific worlds were intense and sometimes furious. Many were also very positive. All expressed different degrees of shock at the originality of the argument.
On this, I recall inviting Liah to Bates (in Lewiston, Maine) in 2009 to deliver her presentation on the book (Eric, you will remember coming, I am sure). One of the largest classrooms on campus was full and in fact had standing room only. I recall the lively Q&A session. I also recall the article the following day in the Lewiston Sun Journal – the town’s main newspaper – and especially the comments of readers – some enthusiastic and curious about what they had read, some angrily saying that she should go back to Socialist Europe where apparently she came from, “where people have no freedom of choice and must therefore be happier” …!
The same logic drove Liah to connect individuals’ acts of terrorism (including mass shootings) to nationalism: lone-wolf terrorists in particular are individuals whose personal trajectories have meant exclusion and experiences of failures in a world where one’s trajectory in life falls squarely on one’s shoulders – and not on their family, networks, social groups, or something else (Greenfeld, 2013b). They suffer from anomie – the sense of alienation that comes when a society fails to equip its members with the required guidance to function successfully (Greenfeld 2013a).
They may accordingly turn to extreme ideologies in reaction, and will seek to be destructive at large (including to themselves). But this means that violent ideologies are not the cause of their behaviors – just the point of arrival for those who are already inclined to do harm. Again, those hearing her arguments expressed bewilderment at the claim. And I am sure many paused to contemplate the uniqueness of the argument.
Let us now turn to globalization. Liah wrote many of her most important works at a time – the end of the Cold War, the presumed victory of the West in world affairs, the ‘end of history’ – when it was very fashionable to argue for the inevitable decline of the nation state. Regions spanning across national borders – North America, for instance, South East Asia, or the European Union – and processes of cooperation at the global level seemed to be dismantling the foundations of those states. Going against the grain, Liah insisted that nationalism remained the building block of the world (Greenfeld, 2006, 2016).
To explain this, Liah put forth a compelling and unexpected thesis: what is happening ‘above’ nations states, and apparently undermining their essence, has actually much to do with nationalism: secularism, fundamental equality, and sovereignty – the key features of nationalism – are simply being projected beyond the borders of nation states and onto the broader community. Nationalism is being globalized. There is, therefore, no tension or contradiction between globalization and nationalism (Greenfeld, 2011). And this is of course very interesting – we are so used to thinking of those two terms as being in contrast to each other.
At the same time, in yet another turn, Liah stressed that nationalism remains in any case very much rooted at the nation-state level. Most of what we consider ‘international’ really entails interactions between nation states – whether economic, athletic, political, or cultural (Greenfeld, 2001, 2016). Nation states compete on the global stage. We thus measure outcomes in national terms – Gross Domestic Products, medals won at the Olympics, Nobel prize winners, fertility rates, and so on. Crucially, this is so also on the military front.
How else to interpret the tragic war in Ukraine, started by Russia in 2022 because of nationalist ambitions – or, as Liah would insist, insecurities (Greenfeld, 1992)? Her writing on Russia’s historical aggressiveness and sense of inferiority toward the West should be highlighted here: they not only provide a clue to the root causes of the war but invite a reassessment of what Russia’s international ambitions are really all about (Greenfeld, 1992, 2016). On this point, I recall asking Liah if we could Zoom – she kindly agreed … [LSE piece where I leverage her thinking …][1]
Let us now go even bigger, in a sense, by turning to Liah’s counterintuitive arguments about the social sciences. Two stand out. First, much of modern sociology is a derivative of Marxism. This might surprise many who have never thought of themselves as Marxists. But this is because her point was not only about ideological orientation. It was also about what we assume about the social world. Recall that Weber and Durkheim were, as she put it, ‘mentalists’: they paid attention to the relationship between the human mind and the social world (Greenfeld, 2006).
This relationship constitutes a reality sui generis – defined therefore by its own laws and properties that are different from biological or material realities. Any discipline with society as the subject of its interests should make this reality its object of analysis (Greenfeld, 2013a). But modern sociologists for the most part operate with a materialist orientation towards the social world (Greenfeld 2006). They are not interested in this third reality but rather in the practical outcomes that are otherwise observable – for instance, differences in life expectancy across social groups or the impact of state structures on revolutions. In this sense, they operate precisely along Marxist lines: Marx explicitly denied the importance of ideas and mind, and only recognized the existence of what he called ‘material’ reality.
Second, the social sciences as practiced in the West have gotten social reality basically all wrong due to a second shortcoming. They have assumed that life in the societies that fall within the Chinese or Indian civilizations unfolds in line with the same first principles as those of the West. These principles were made possible by the embrace of monotheism in earlier times: they include the principle of non-contradiction that is the basis of logic and science, secularism, the individual as autonomous actor, and particular understandings of justice (Greenfeld, 2025). While societies within the Chinese or Indian civilizations certainly can and do adopt and leverage elements of Western logic (Chinese biologists, for instance, are as good as German ones; and Indian computer scientists are as good as American ones), they function on the bases of different presuppositions.
Hence, Western social scientists have been wrong in assuming that conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence from Western cases apply everywhere, or that we should approach non-Western societies assuming they function as Western ones (Greenfeld, 2025). Hence, Liah observed, when we consider things like formal organizations (like educational institutions) or informal ones (like the family, say), we should realize that they operate within larger contexts that define the boundaries and nature of their operational and structural principles. In one of her recent lectures, delivered on YouTube, she offered the analogy of Russian dolls – open the bigger doll and you will find the smaller ones.
Let’s pause for a moment. We could go on – and I imagine additional ideas about her unconventionality are buzzing in many of your minds as well.
Now, let me proceed by highlighting two major sorts of questions that derive from the above. That is – by pointing to two sorts of issues that Liah’ approach generated.
First, methodologically speaking, how did Liah reach her conclusions? And what are the methodological flaws inherent to existing paradigms? It is not surprising that many of Liah’s critics have focused on her methods and, in conjunction with that, the quality or relevance of the empirical materials she presents (see, for instance, Caan, 2014). This is to be expected: unusual and provocative arguments are often subject to methodological scrutiny. Even those who like her work a great deal have dissected her approaches. In their case, of course, it has been primarily to learn from her, and in any event with the conviction that methodological flaws would not detract from her arguments’ power. There is in fact something beautiful and transcendental in Liah’s thought that makes any technical quibble irrelevant.
But still, the unconventionality of her claims almost begs that attention be given to her methods. And here I am actually a little bit at a loss as I contemplate the matter as it applies across all of her major arguments – unconventional or not. Some things are empirically testable in a fairly straightforward matter: is it true, for instance, that there is great competition among nation states? And that that competition happens in secular spheres such as the economy, science, and sports? I think these are testable (and non-controversial) propositions.
Plenty of competitions (with their relevant competitive metrics) occur among nations. But what about the notion, say, that we are very invested in such competition because we are so attached to the nation, and this is because the nation grants us an unprecedented amount of dignity? How should we measure how much nationalism has granted people an unprecedented sense of dignity? How do we operationalize the variables at play, over time as well (dignity in the 1400s, dignity in the 1800s)? I have thought about the dignity argument a great deal, and I believe it is correct. But I am not sure it is easy to demonstrate. And I am not sure she did demonstrate it (I will add that I do not think she was too concerned in fact with demonstrating it – which adds another wrinkle to the discussion).
Second, the counterintuitive conclusions lead to countless practical (and not only academic) implications. We are pressed to ask what might follow if her bold claims are at least partly correct. Those questions concern everything from the most intimate personal dynamics one experiences to global-level cultural, economic, and political matters.
For instance, if it is indeed true that, because of nationalism, children from a young age must be equipped with the tools to feel a sense of worth regardless of their everyday failures or successes, what does this mean for the role of education in their early years? Liah herself, it turns out, offered an answer in the form of children’s books she authored (Greenfeld, 2023a, 2023b). Or how, as we move toward the macro-level, should the West deal with countries belonging to the great civilizations of India and China, once the latter are understood to operate with fundamentally different first principles (Greenfeld, 2025)? On the practical front still, what should we do about the social sciences? Her recommendations call for a full revamping of just about every discipline … good luck to us all!
And then there is the practical consideration that we should honor Liah in our own work by trying to be as inspirational and magic as she was. Whatever she gave many of us as students, if we are now teachers, we should try and pass it on to our students. The sense that real ideas – deep, provocative, daring ideas – are still worth pursuing. The sense that we should feel free to look beyond established boundaries if that is where logic points us, even if it means standing slightly or a lot outside the contours of our discipline as currently practiced.
And, finally, there was also her commitment to us, her encouragement and belief in our own imaginative work, her kindness and devotion to the younger generations. This, too, is something that we should try and emulate.
Thank you again for inviting me to share these thoughts. And thank you for listening.
References
Caan, W., “Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience. By Liah Greenfeld,” British Journal of Psychiatry, 204(2), 167–168, 2014.
Durkheim, Émile, The Division of Labor in Society (W. D. Halls, Trans.), Free Press (Original work published 1893), 1984.
Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Harvard University Press, 1992.
Greenfeld, Liah, The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth, Harvard University Press, 2001
Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture. Oneworld Publications, 2006.
Greenfeld, Liah, “The Globalization of Nationalism and the Future of the Nation–State,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 24, 5–9. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-010-9110-8, 2011
Greenfeld, Liah, Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience, Harvard University Press, 2013a.
Greenfeld, Liah. “Home-grown Terrorists: Actually Terrorists or Mentally Ill?” Psychology Today, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-modern-mind/201306/home-grown-terrorists-actually-terrorists-or-mentally-ill, 2013b, June 3.
Greenfeld, Liah, Advanced Introduction to Nationalism, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016.
Greenfeld, Liah, “Reflections on Durkheim in Hong Kong. Dogma: Édition Printemps-Été,” http://www.dogma.lu/pdf/LG-Durkheim.pdf, 2018.
Greenfeld, Liah, The Giant Cockroach, Amazon Publishing Plus, 2023a.
Greenfeld, Liah, Miss Buzzz, the Fly. Amazon Publishing Plus, 2023b.
Greenfeld, Liah, “Towards the Systematic Cross-Civilizational Comparison: How Civilizations Work – Case 1: The Monotheistic Civilization,” Comparative Civilizations Review, 93,1, Article 13, 2025. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol93/iss1/13
Weber, Max, “The Nature of Charismatic Domination,” In W. G. Runciman (Ed.), Max Weber: Selections in translation (E. Matthews, Trans., pp. 226–250). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1922), 1978.
Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (S. Kalberg, Trans.). Roxbury Publishing, (Original work published 1904–1905), 2001.
[1] I directly benefited from a discussion with Liah on this very matter shortly after the start of the war. The resulting short article was published in 2022: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/18/understanding-putins-war-of-resentment-and-how-to-stop-it/