

NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:

THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND THE CASES OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND
RUSSIA

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I. INTRODUCTION

"Democracy" is a capacious concept. No special expertise is needed to recognize that it means different things to different people. Connoting in general the idea of popular sovereignty (from "demos"—people, and "kratein"—to rule), the word is used to describe political structures that have very little in common, apart from the fact that in all of them, evidently, democracy is seen as an important value. In certain cases at least, this universal approbation is the only reason for adopting (the concept of) democracy: it is a manner of collective self-validation. The countries that have the word "democratic" in their official names—such as Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, or Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea—would hardly be considered model democracies by Western standards.¹ Neither, obviously, would the no longer existing German Democratic Republic, so called to distinguish itself from the other, apparently nondemocratic, Germany which it now joined. In their turn, Western democracies, referring to themselves as "liberal" or "constitutional" democracies, have been—until a couple of years ago consistently—called "formal" and "false" by people in "people's republics" all over the world, the true democracy in the eyes of the latter being "socialist" democracy.

Which of these democracies ("socialist" or "bourgeois," "liberal" and "constitutional" or "social" and "economic," "organic," "guided," "new," or "high") are true, and which are false, is fundamentally a question of semantics. But the decision as to which of them to adhere to is, obviously, not. It is a matter of gravest consequence, with profound implications in every sphere of social life. In the modern world, the political character and social structure of a society depends not on whether it is "democratic" or not (for every one of the 187 nations of the globe today, including absolute monarchies and dictatorships more modern in character, accept the principle of popular sovereignty and claim to be or to aspire to become democracies), but on the specific definition of "democracy" (and the *meaning* of popular sovereignty) in that society. This is an important point which has not been given the attention it demands. Adherence to the "ideals of democracy," profession of desire for "democratic reforms" in the end of the twentieth century place societies in question in the end of the twentieth century, no more. As abstract notions of "truth" and "justice," which take on different, often contradictory, meanings in different social contexts, adherence to "democracy" tells us nothing about the character and aspirations of a people. Were this recognized, there is no doubt that recent transformations, referred to as "revolutions of 1989," would appear to us in a very different light. The euphoria with which the news of the upheaval were met in the West, and specifically in the United States, should be attributed to the lack of such recognition.

Obviously, the joy of the Western nations over the prospective "democratization" of the world (and specifically Eastern Europe) was aroused not by the apparently

increasing popularity of the word; neither, one would hope, was it caused by the prospect that from now on societies previously subject to self-appointed rulers would choose their despots in an orderly fashion. It was caused, rather, by the naive presupposition that "democracy" everywhere means "liberal" or "constitutional" democracy, that, in every language, democratic incantations are a sign of awakening to the idea of the human rights—the respect for the individual characteristic of the West.

One should emphasize that it is the respect for the individual as the basis of the principle of popular sovereignty, not the principle as such, and not the "democratic procedures," which lies at the basis of liberal or constitutional democracy. The idea of popular sovereignty, as was mentioned above, can be interpreted in many ways and forms the basis of legitimacy in every modern polity. The procedures are the tools through which the principles of liberal democracy are implemented, but, as other tools, they may be used for the implementation of other principles as well. It is possible to import the procedures, without at the same time importing the principles that first brought them into being, they do not constitute liberal democracy, but enable it to function. Thus both the general principle of democracy and the formal democratic procedures can coexist with different political regimes (authoritarian and liberal), and with different social and economic structures (egalitarian as against rigidly stratified—whether ethnically, culturally, politically, or economically—societies, capitalist as against socialist economies), while the idea of the human rights, in distinction, favors, and is therefore associated with a particular type of political, social and economic structure—liberal, egalitarian, and capitalist. The idea of the human rights implies the *equality* of all mature individuals under the law which guarantees to each of them the enjoyment of certain inalienable rights, specifically the right of self-government or liberty. This right is exercised through majority rule, but only as a result of the "freely given consent" of the minority, human rights setting limits on the power of the majority.

In the rest of this paper, "democracy" will refer to the "liberal" or "constitutional" democracy based on the idea of human rights. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of nationalism and democracy thus defined. Such examination may help us to assess the probability of transition to democracy among nations now in turmoil as a result of the revolutions of 1989.

II. THE IDEA OF THE "NATION";

TYPES AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM

What all democracies—liberal and not liberal—share, the only thing they necessarily share, is their nationalism. The idea of popular sovereignty—the literal meaning of democracy—is also the idea which lies at the basis of nationalism. Nationalism is the form in which modern democracy appeared in the world, and it may be reasonably argued that there are as many forms of democracy as there are nations.

The term "nationalism," in its neutral, general sense, refers to the set of ideas and sentiments, which forms the conceptual framework of national identity. National identity is one among many, often coexisting and overlapping identities—occupational, religious, tribal, linguistic, territorial, class, gender, and more. But in the modern world, national identity constitutes what may be called the "fundamental identity," the one that is believed to define the very essence of the individual, which the other identities one may have modify but slightly, and, as a result, these other identities are considered secondary. All contemporary "nations" are derived from entities which previously possessed quite different identities and were defined differently. The first nation was England which became one in the sixteenth century. France and Russia defined themselves as such in the eighteenth century. Most others followed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.²

The specificity of nationalism, that which distinguishes national identity from other types of identity, derives from the fact that the source of individual identity, in nationalism, is located within a "people" which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity. The "people" is a mass of a population whose boundaries and nature are defined in various ways, but which is usually perceived as larger than any concrete community and always as fundamentally homogeneous and only superficially divided by the lines of status, class, locality, or (in rare cases) even ethnicity.³ This specificity of nationalism is conceptual. The only foundation of nationalism in general, the only factor, that is, without which no nationalism is possible, is the presence of a certain idea. The idea which lies at the core of nationalism, as might have been expected, is the idea of the "nation."

It is most significant that at the time when the word "nation" acquired its modern meaning and became the synonym of the "people," it meant "an elite," and specifically "an elite of representatives of cultural and political authority" (Zernatto 1944). It was in this meaning that it was applied, in the early sixteenth century, to the people of England. The equation of the two concepts, "people" and "nation," (of which the modern principle of popular sovereignty, and thus modern democracy was a corollary) signified a conceptual revolution, for, while the general referent of the word "people" prior to it was the population of a region, specifically the word applied to the lower classes and was most frequently used in the sense of "rabble" or "plebs."

The redefinition of the "people" as a "nation" symbolically elevated the populace to the position of an elite. This symbolic elevation both reflected and reinforced a tremendous change of attitude, for with it many members of the society willingly identified with a group, from which earlier the better placed of them could only wish to dissociate themselves.

National identity in its distinctive modern sense is, therefore, an identity which derives from the membership in a "people," the fundamental characteristic of which is that it is defined as a "nation." Every member of the "people" thus interpreted partakes in its superior, elite quality, and it is in consequence, that a stratified national population is perceived as essentially homogeneous, and the people as sovereign. This principle lies at the basis of all nationalisms and justifies viewing them as expressions of the same general phenomenon. Apart from it, different nationalisms share little. The national populations—diversely termed "peoples," "nations," and "nationalities"—are defined in many ways and the criteria of membership in them vary. The multiformity which results is the source of the conceptually evasive, Protean nature of nationalism and the cause of the perennial frustration of its students, vainly trying to define it with the help of one or another "objective" factor, which are only rendered relevant to the problem if the national principle happens to be applied to them.

There are important exceptions to every relationship in terms of which nationalism has ever been interpreted—whether with common territory or common language, statehood or shared traditions, history or race. None of these relationships proved inevitable. But from the definition proposed above it follows not only that such exceptions are to be expected, but that nationalism does not have to be related to any of these factors, though as a rule it is related to at least some of them. In other words, *nationalism is not necessarily a form of particularism*. It is a political ideology (or a class of political ideologies derived from the same basic principle) and as such it does not have to be identified with any particular community. A nation coextensive with humanity is in no way a contradiction in terms. The United States of the World, which may perhaps exist in the future, with the sovereignty vested in the population, and the various segments of the latter regarded as equal, would be a nation in the strict sense of the word within the framework of nationalism. The United States of America represents an approximation to precisely such state of affairs.

As it is, however, nationalism is the most common and salient form of particularism in the modern world. Moreover, if compared to forms of particularism it has replaced, it is a particularly effective (or, depending on one's viewpoint, pernicious) form of particularism, because, as every individual derives his or her identity from the membership in the community, the sense of commitment to it and its collective goals is much more widespread. In a world divided into particular communities, national identity tends to be associated and confounded with a community's sense of uniqueness and qualities contributing to it. These qualities (social, political, cultural in the narrow sense, or ethnic), therefore acquire a great significance in the formation of every specific nationalism.

Semantic revolutions do not happen in the ethereal world of ideas, nor do they happen entirely in the mind. They happen in society and are often predicated upon changes in structural conditions. The concept of the "nation" as "an elite" was a result of a long series of transformations which combined structural and semantic elements. At each stage in this process, the concept (the meaning of the word), which came with a certain semantic baggage, evolved out of usage within a particular set of structural constraints. The dominant meaning of the word at any given time was applied within new circumstances to a certain aspect of which it corresponded. However, other aspects of these circumstances, which did not originally correspond to this dominant meaning, became associated with the word, creating a duality of meaning. The initially dominant meaning was gradually eclipsed, a new one emerged as dominant, and, while the word was retained, one concept gave way to another. The process of semantic transformation was constantly redirected by structural constraints which formed new concepts. At the same time, the structural constraints were conceptualized, interpreted, or defined, in terms of the inherited concepts, which thereby oriented social action. The definition of the situation changed as the concepts evolved, changing orientations too.

The concept "nation" meaning "an elite" evolved in the setting of the medieval church councils, the parties of which, called "nations" represented political and cultural authority—increasingly interpreted as sovereignty—of various ecclesiastical and secular principalities. Such a concept could only be applied to the people of England, if it corresponded to some aspect of this people. This means that the people of England had to act as an elite in some way prior to the application of the concept "nation," and could no longer be just "plebs," which presupposed a profound change in the structural conditions of the English society. Specifically, as will be explained shortly, this change expressed itself in that numbers of individuals who rose from the "people" and could be defined as of it, found themselves in positions of greatest authority. The idea of the "nation" acknowledged this experience and rationalized it. The individuals of the "people" could exercise authority because the people were not rabble, but an elite, a "nation," and, as such, sovereign. And "nation," in turn, came to mean "a sovereign people."

This semantic transformation, which occurred in England because of the structural transformation that prompted the redefinition of the "people" as an elite, signaled the emergence of the first nation in the world, in the sense in which the word is understood today, and launched the era of nationalism. But the process did not stop there.

As the word "nation" in its conciliar and at the time dominant meaning of an elite was applied to the population of England, it became cognitively linked with the existing connotations of a population and a country (political, territorial, and ethnic). When later the word was applied to other populations and countries, it was applied in the sense of "a sovereign people," which it acquired in England, and already not because (or not necessarily because) these other populations acted as elites, but because all of them necessarily had some political, territorial, and/or ethnic qualities to distinguish them. As a result, the word "nation" changed its meaning once again, coming to signify "a *unique* sovereign people." The new concept of the nation in most

cases eclipsed the one immediately preceding it, as the latter eclipsed those from which it descended, but, significantly, this did not happen everywhere. Due to the persistence and, in certain places, development and extension of structural conditions responsible for the evolution of the original idea of the nation, the two concepts now coexist.

The term "nation," applied to both, conceals important differences. The emergence of the more recent concept signified a profound transformation in the nature of nationalism, and the two concepts under one name reflect two radically different forms of the phenomenon (which means both two radically different forms of national identity, and two radically different types of national collectivities—nations). The two branches of nationalism are obviously related in a significant way, but are grounded in different values and develop for different reasons. They also give rise to dissimilar patterns of social behavior, culture and political institutions, often conceptualized as expressions of unlike “national characters.”

These differences are partly attributable to the differences in the order in which structural and symbolic factors in the process of the transformation of identity influenced each other and the manner in which they interacted in various cases. The adoption of the idea of the nation always implied symbolic elevation of the populace (and therefore the creation of a new social order, a new structural reality). But in the case of the original concept of the nation as a "sovereign people," the idea was inspired by the structural context which preceded its formation: the people acting in some way as a political elite, and actually exercising sovereignty; the influence of the idea and of the ongoing social processes reinforced each other. In distinction, in the latter case, of the concept of the nation as “a *unique* sovereign people”, the idea of popular sovereignty—part and parcel of the idea of the nation—was imported into a social and political structure unprepared for it, and as the idea modified the structure, it was in turn modified by the latter.

In the process, the nature of sovereignty was inevitably reinterpreted. The observable sovereignty of the people (its nationality) in the former case was the implication of the actual sovereignty of individuals, it was because they actually exercised sovereignty that these individuals (of the people) composed a “nation.” The “nation,” originally, was a composite entity, the idea was individualistic. The *theoretical* sovereignty of the people in the case of the later form of nationalism, by contrast, was an implication of the people's uniqueness, its very being a distinct people, because this was the meaning of the nation, and the nation was, by definition, sovereign. That national principle thus was collectivistic, it reflected the collective being. Collectivistic ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for, when the collectivity is seen in unitary terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective individual possessed of a single will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter. The reification of a community introduces (or preserves) fundamental inequality between those of its few members who are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such qualifications; the select few dictate to the masses who must obey.

These two dissimilar interpretations of popular sovereignty underlie the basic types of nationalism, which one may classify as individualistic-libertarian and collectivistic-authoritarian types. In addition, nationalism may be distinguished

according to criteria of membership in the national collectivity, which may be either "civic," that is identical with citizenship, or "ethnic." In the former case, nationality is at least in principle open and voluntaristic, it can and sometimes must be acquired; in the latter—it is believed to be inherent, one can neither acquire it if one does not have it, nor change it if one does; it has nothing to do with individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic. Individualistic nationalism cannot be but civic, but civic nationalism can also be collectivistic (although the combination of a collectivistic definition of the nation with civic criteria of membership is highly problematic). More often, collectivistic nationalism takes on the form of ethnic particularism, while ethnic nationalism is necessarily collectivistic. The crosstabulation of these categories renders the following three types of nationalism.

It must be kept in mind, of course, that these are only categories which serve to pinpoint certain characteristic tendencies within different—specific—nationalisms. They should be regarded as models which can be approximated, but are unlikely to be fully realized. In reality, obviously, the most common type is a mixed one. But the compositions of the mixtures vary significantly enough to justify their classification in these terms and render it a useful analytical tool.

Table 1. Types of Nationalism
(and representative examples of each type)

	Civic	Ethnic
Individualistic- Libertarian	<i>Type I</i> (England)	VOID
Collectivistic- Authoritarian	<i>Type II</i> (France)	<i>Type III</i> (Russia)

To understand how any particular nationalism acquired its specific form, and why it belongs to one type and not another, one has to analyze how it emerged. The processes of formation of the three types of nationalism are different, because of the differential significance and impact of various factors in them, even though the very same factors can be distinguished in the emergence of every nationalism. These factors fall, basically, into three categories: structural, cultural, and psychological, but the specific nature of each is a variable.

The adoption of national identity in every case (whether as a result of creation-as in England, or of importation—as in other countries) was a response to a fundamentally similar structural situation. It occurred because an influential group (or groups) were dissatisfied with its traditional identity as a result of a profound inconsistency between the definition of social order expressed in it and the experience of the involved actors. This inconsistency could result from upward or downward mobility of whole strata, from conflation of social roles (which might imply contradictory expectations from the same individuals), or from the appearance of new roles which did not fit existing categories. Whatever the cause of an identity crisis, its structural manifestation was in every case the same—“anomie.”⁴ This might be, but was not necessarily the condition of the society at large; it did, however, directly affect the relevant agents. Since the agents were different in different cases, the anomie was expressed and experienced differently. Very often it took the form of status-inconsistency which, depending on its mature, could be accompanied by a profound sense of insecurity and anxiety.

The specific nature of the change and its effects on the agents in each case deeply influenced the character of nationalism in it. The underlying ideas of nationality were shaped and modified in accordance with the situational constraints of the actors, and the aspirations, frustrations and interests which these constraints generated. This often involved reinterpreting them in terms of indigenous traditions which might have existed alongside the dominant system of ideas in which the now rejected traditional identity was imbedded, as well as elements of this system of ideas itself, which were not rejected. Such reinterpretation implied incorporation of pre-national modes of

thought within the nascent national consciousness, which were then carried on in it and reinforced.

The effects of these structural and cultural influences frequently combined with that of a certain psychological factor which both necessitated a reinterpretation of the imported ideas and determined the direction of such reinterpretation: *ressentiment*. A term coined by Nietzsche (1887) and later defined and developed by Max Scheler (1912), *ressentiment* refers to a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility to act them out, which in many cases leads to the "transvaluation of values." The sociological bases for *ressentiment*—or structural conditions that are necessary for the development of this psychological state—are two. The first (the structural basis of envy itself) is the fundamental comparability between the subject and the object of envy, or rather the belief on the part of the subject in the fundamental equality between them, which makes them in principle interchangeable. The second condition is the actual inequality (perceived as not fundamental) of such dimensions that it rules the practical achievement of the theoretically existing equality out. The presence of these conditions renders a situation *ressentiment*-prone, irrespectively of the temperaments and psychological makeup of the individuals who compose the relevant population. *Ressentiment* could be inspired by a situation within the community that was to be defined as a nation, or by the position of this community relative to other communities. Most often the two were confounded, the unsatisfactory internal situation was interpreted as a result of foreign influence, and a community outside became the chief object of *ressentiment*. *Ressentiment* felt by the groups that imported the idea of the nation and articulated the national consciousness of their respective societies usually resulted in the selection out of their own, indigenous traditions of elements hostile to the original national principle and in their deliberate cultivation. In certain cases—notably in Russia—where indigenous cultural resources were absent, or clearly insufficient, *ressentiment* was the single most important factor in determining the specific terms in which national identity was defined. Everywhere it existed it fostered particularistic pride and xenophobia, providing emotional nourishment for the nascent national sentiment and sustaining it whenever it faltered.

Analytically, the three classes of variables (structural, cultural, and psychological) may also be seen as stages in the formation of nationalisms, the structural being the basic stage, to which cultural and psychological ones are superadded. The character of the first type of nationalism (individualistic and civic) and of the first nationalism in history (the English) was essentially determined by the structural factors, while cultural factors (elements of indigenous traditions) influenced it but little, and the psychological ones (*ressentiment*) had virtually no impact. The second historical type (collectivistic and civic) bears the imprint of structural and cultural variables in approximately equal measure, and only in the historically third type of nationalism (collectivistic and ethnic) the psychological *factor—ressentiment*—plays a crucial formative role.

Identity defines the individual and (in the case of an identity which is both individual and collective, such as national identity) the group in the social environment. It defines the place of the individual and the group in relation to other individuals and groups, behaviors which are appropriate in different settings, one's own actions and reactions and those one may expect from others. National identity, in particular, like other comprehensive, general identities, is a reflection of the image of social order dominant in a given society, the matrix of the fundamental values which inform—and orient—behavior in every sphere of social life. The specific national identity of any particular society determines the basic structure of motivations in it and, consequently, the nature of that national society itself.

This consideration is of an utmost importance for the understanding of the prospects of democracy. While a polity being (defined as) a nation in effect implies that it is a democracy in the general, abstract sense (for the essence of national identity is *the* democratic principle of popular sovereignty) liberal or constitutional democracy is compatible only with individualistic civic nationalisms. Originally, nationalism developed as a liberal democracy; where the conditions of such original development persisted, the identity between the two was maintained. But as nationalism spread in different conditions and the emphasis in the idea of the nation moved from the sovereign character to the uniqueness of the people, the original equivalence between it and democratic principles was lost. One implication of this that should be emphasized is that democracy (as it is understood here) may not be exportable. It may be an inherent predisposition in certain nations (inherent in their very definition as nations—i.e., the original idea of the nation), yet entirely alien to others, and the ability to adopt and develop it in the latter may require a change of identity.

This is not an entirely hopeless position, for identities do change. National identity has replaced religious and estate identities, which were defining for the majority of the people in earlier times, and it too can be replaced by other, perhaps as yet unknown to us identities. Within nationalism itself, a change from one type of national identity to another is also possible. In the wake of profound structural transformations (specifically affecting and reorganizing the elites, whether as a result of deep changes in the economy, culture, or as an outcome of war and occupation) an originally collectivistic nationalism can become individualistic, an originally ethnic one—civic, and vice versa. Such changes, however, occur very rarely, and so long as the identity remains unchanged, the fundamental structure of motivations in it remains unchanged, and an incorporation of patterns of behavior and values inconsistent with it cannot be expected. A stable liberal

democracy is unlikely in a collectivistic civic nationalism in which the rights of the nation as a matter of course take precedence over the human rights of the members, and is impossible in an ethnic nationalism whose very nature presupposes the rejection of the individual as an independent actor and thus of the idea of human rights.

What follows is a brief discussion of the development and nature of national identity—and its compatibility with and implications for democracy—in England, France, and Russia. The first major societies to be defined as nations, these three exemplify the three types of nationalism, England being a case of individualistic civic nationalism; France, of collectivistic civic; and Russia, of ethnic nationalism.

England

The original shift in attitudes expressed in the equation of "people" and "nation," and thus in the symbolic elevation of the populace to the position of an elite happened in England and was due to the massive restructuring the English society underwent in the sixteenth century as a result of several independent but interacting factors.⁵ The Wars of the Roses decimated the traditional, feudal aristocracy, which created a vacuum on the top of the social hierarchy and invited upward mobility. This, and the needs of the new dynasty, the Tudors, determined the character of the new aristocracy, which was predominantly an official elite. Its emergence in the 1530s coincided with the elimination of clergy from the key positions in the administration, which made the Crown dependent on the services of the university-trained laymen (MacCaffrey 1965; Stone 1965, 1972). The members of the new aristocracy were people of remarkable abilities and education, but they were recruited from minor gentry and even lower strata. The elite status, at least temporarily, became dependent on merit, rather than birth. This fundamental transformation demanded justification, and it was accomplished by nationalism. The idea of the nation—of the people as an elite—appealed to the new aristocracy: nationality, as it were, made every Englishman a nobleman, and blue blood was no longer the condition for high positions in society.

Since the idea of the nation was first appreciated by the new aristocracy, the segment of the population that needed its rationalizing and legitimating power was constantly growing. The growth of the gentry in numbers and in wealth, due to the redistribution of Church properties and the reorganization of the countryside, was complemented by parallel developments among the professions and the merchants (Moore 1966; Stone 1965, 1972). This amounted to the creation of broad, heterogeneous, achievement-oriented middle class. The idea of the nation appealed to it, no less than it did to the new aristocracy. It justified its de facto equality with the latter in some areas, as well as its aspirations for upward mobility, increased participation in the political process, and more power. The representatives of this class sat in the House of Commons, and while their growing national consciousness led them to demand more power for the Parliament, the increasing importance of the Parliament reinforced their sense of nationality.

The importance of the Parliament increased, among other things, because of the constant dependence of the first Tudors on the good will of their subjects. The authority of Henry VII, who won the crown on a battlefield, was based on little more than the willingness of the people to have him as their king. He was also dependent on the Parliament financially, and thus could not afford to be disrespectful in its regard. The position of Henry VIII also necessitated a constantly deferential stance toward the people and its representatives in the Parliament. He made the Parliament a party in the "great matter" of the break from Rome and, for his own reasons, supported the growth of national consciousness.

The great importance of Henry's break from Rome was that it opened the doors to Protestantism, which was, perhaps, the most significant among the factors that furthered the development of English nationalism. Although nationalism predated the Reformation and most likely contributed to its appeal in England, the already growing national consciousness was strengthened manifold when it became confluent with the Protestant Reformation. For a great mass of common Englishmen, the English Bible and the unprecedented stimulation of literacy were functionally equivalent to the effects of the social elevation on the new aristocracy. This mass of readers, too, was elevated and acquired a totally new, dignified, status, the sense of which was reinforced by national identity and led them to embrace it. The counter-Reformational policies of Mary Tudor were perceived as also antinational and succeeded in antagonizing the common people as well as the elite group with a vested interest in both Protestantism and nationalism. The end of her reign, which came so soon, made this latter group the ruling group in the country for many years and brought about the close association of Protestant and national causes (Haller 1963). This association provided the growing national consciousness with the divine sanction at the time when only religious sentiments were self-legitimizing, and secured it the protection of its own strongest rival. Thus English nationalism was allowed the time to gestate and helped to permeate every sphere of political and cultural life. By 1600 it spread into every sector of society except the lowest. In the seventeenth century the existence in England of national consciousness and identity, and as a result, of a new geopolitical entity, a nation, was a fact.

This evolution of English nationalism was due to structural, rather than cultural factors, even the impact of Protestantism, it is important to emphasize, was structural. The relative unimportance of cultural factors in this case was related to the absence of an articulate sense of Englishness (a unique English identity) before nationalism, although, of course, some inarticulate, vague sense must have been present. The absence of an articulate English identity is explained, chiefly, by the nonspecific character of the English Catholicism and by the French connections of the crown and the nobility.

Yet, Protestantism, specifically its insistence on the priesthood of all believers, reinforced the individualistic and antiauthoritarian implications of the English idea of the nation—the people as an elite—which acknowledged and rationalized the actually existing novel social conditions. Like the idea of the nation, the Protestant idea helped to make sense of the fact of massive social mobility, and particularly the possibility of upward mobility from lower strata into the aristocracy. The dignity of each believer implied in the priesthood (equality in a very high status) of all corresponded to the dignity of each and equality of all Englishmen, implied in the membership in the nation.

The social and political implications of the English idea of the nation were articulated in the writings of the Whig philosophers in the second half of the seventeenth century. The English nation was defined as a composite entity, not a collective individual (for which reason the word “nation” was often used as a plural), a “civil state,” a union—in fact a confederacy—of men as “rational Creatures,” formed by “mutual consent” and “founded on some common good or interest” (Shaftesbury 1790). It was, emphatically, not a “primordial” unit: the English prided themselves on their multiracial origins. For Shaftesbury, to derive national identity and loyalty from the accident of birth was absurd.

... had it happened to one of us British men to have been born at sea, could we not therefore properly be called British men?" he asked. "It may therefore be esteemed not better than a mere subterfuge of narrow minds to assign this natural passion for society and a country, to such a relation as that of a mere fungus or common excrescence, to its parent-mould, or nursing dunghill (Shaftesbury, 1790, pp. 120-121).

The definition of a nation was identical with the definition of a constitutional democracy. Though the term “democracy” was not used at the time, and had, generally, derogatory connotations, nationalism meant nothing less than the adherence to the principles of the latter. Shaftesbury insisted:

A multitude held together by force, though under one and the same head, is not properly united: nor does such a body make a people. It is the social league, confederacy, and mutual consent, founded in some common good or interest, which joins the members of a community, and make a People one. Absolute Power annuls *the publick*; and where there is no *publick*, or

constitution, there is in reality no *mother-Country*, or Nation (Shaftsbury, 1790, p.119n).

This concept of the polity was based on the belief in man as an essentially rational being (a notion originally derived from religion: man was endowed with reason for he was created in the image of God). Reason was the defining characteristic of humanity. Its possession, namely the possession of an ability to consider and choose between alternatives, entitled one to decide what is best for oneself, and was the basis for the recognition of the autonomy of the individual conscience and the principle of civic liberty. Moreover, since human beings were equal in this crucial respect, in principle they had the equal right to participate in collective decisions. The fulfillment of human nature thus implied political participation, active membership in one's political community, or what we now understand as citizenship. The concept of the nation was based on the sense of respect toward the individual, the emphasis on the dignity of a human being. The love of nation—national patriotism, or nationalism—in this framework meant first and foremost a principled individualism, a commitment to the ideal of human rights. (Not coincidentally, the idea of human rights was first articulated—by Englishmen Hobbes and, especially, Locke—during the same period.)

The correspondence between the concept of the nation and the reality was not perfect: in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and for a long time after England was no modern democracy. Not all the people of England were actually included in the nation, for the faculty of reason—theoretically a necessary concomitant of humanity—in practice was thought to be developed unevenly. Yet, for its time, in Europe, or by the standards of any of the non-European agrarian empires of that or any other age, England was an exceptionally egalitarian and liberal society. The commitment to the idea of the nation on the part of the most active and articulate segment of the English population signified a profound change in political culture and could not fail to affect and eventually bring social reality into a closer alignment with it.

France

In distinction to England, in France, an articulate sense of being French and a unique French identity, existed centuries before it was reinterpreted as *national* identity. Made possible by the continuity, independence, and early, albeit relative, centralization of the authority of kings who adopted the name “French,” the prenational French identity was articulated by clerics as early as the twelfth century. At that time, it was in fact a religious identity and had the meaning of the awareness of the religious uniqueness of the kingdom: the French king and his domains were the *most* Christian of all kings and domains, the specificity of their Christianity consisted in its perfection (Beane 1985; Citron 1987; Lestocquoy 1968; Martin 1949).

The assumption of the superior Christianity of the French was used to justify the consistent attempts of the French kings to liberate themselves from the tutelage of Rome. In this process, French Catholicism grew increasingly idiosyncratic, the cult of

the French royal lineage, “la religion royale,” becoming its central element. The king came to be seen as the true vicar of God on earth, thus by-passing the link with the universal church, and the religious and political spheres were confounded. In late medieval France, to be a good Christian meant to be a devoted subject of the French king.

This development was strongly reinforced by the events of the sixteenth century. The religious civil wars weakened the link between Frenchness and Catholicism, and political identity took precedence over the religious. This shift in relative centrality of political versus religious loyalties was reflected in the saying attributed to the Huguenot leader Henry of Navarre, who became King Henry IV of France, when he converted to Catholicism: “Paris vaut bien une messe.” The accession of this religiously indifferent prince to the throne of “the most Christian” king further promoted the secularization of the French identity and its transformation from religious into political. The idea of the divine right of kings, the basis of the French absolutism, was directly related to this transformation. The authority of the king was absolute, because it came directly from God (Church 1941; Figgis [1896] 1965).

The political French identity implied membership in the community of the subjects of the French king, a community constituted by the relationship to the king and defined by the circumference of the king’s authority. This community and the area within which the royal authority applied and which it animated came to be conceptualized as the “state.” To begin with, the “state” was inseparable from the person of the king, the word was but a shorthand for the royal prerogative. But, during the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu—the prime minister of Louis XIII, the meaning of the concept changed. Under Richelieu, the powers delegated to and exercised by king’s officials (especially those of Richelieu himself) grew so extensive, as to lead some malcontents to say that there were two kings in France. Richelieu insisted on complete obedience to his will on the grounds that he represented the king’s authority, the “state,” and was staunchly supported in this by the king himself. But since the officials, clearly, were not the king, the “state”—the sphere of king’s authority—became separated from the king’s person and emerged as an object of loyalty in its own right (Church 1972; Mousnier 1954, 1980; Ranum 1963a, 1963b).

Under Louis XIV, who decided to rule without a prime minister, the king and his state became reunited, but to those made unhappy by his policies, the “state” as an object of loyalty separate from the king provided a rallying point, which justified their discontent and served as a moral ground for the opposition to royal absolutism. As the “state” replaced the king as the object of loyalty in the minds of some Frenchmen, their identity necessarily changed again. This time it was becoming national identity.

Since the French idea of the nation developed on the basis and within the tradition of the French thought about the “state,” the understanding of the nature of the French idea of the “state” is essential for the understanding of French nationalism. Specifically, it is important to stress its abstract character—the “state” is the embodiment of authority; its absolute sovereignty—it is subject only to the direct divine sanction and otherwise is the source of all law; and its unitary nature—it is one and indivisible and cannot have but one will. All these characteristics eventually became the characteristics of the French “nation,” which helps to account, among other things, for the role of the state—that is central government—in contemporary France.

French nationalism was greatly influenced by the nature of the tradition in which it was embedded. But, within this cultural framework, national identity developed for structural reasons. The chief among these was the perpetual and increasingly acute status-inconsistency, and therefore, *anomie* of the French nobility. Beginning with the efforts of François I and Henry II in the sixteenth century, the feudal lords of France were consistently deprived of a role in the government, at the same time as greater numbers of them were becoming courtiers and spending their time (and money) at the royal court, rather than on their estates. This latter development helped to deplete the wealth of the aristocracy, and as a result their status was separated both from wealth and from power. The aristocracy was becoming increasingly dependent on the royal power, or, to put it bluntly, on the whim of the absolute ruler (Chaussinand-Nogaret 1985; Ford 1953; Mousnier 1974). This was the nature of absolutism, and it is this (dependence) that distinguished it from feudalism, in which barons enjoyed relative *independence*, thus forming a decentralized political structure. The French absolutist kings and their nobles saw each other as enemies. The nobility opposed absolutism and fought the monarchy's new claims and machinery in a series of futile attempts (of which the *Fronde* is perhaps the most famous). By the time Louis XIV came of age, the local base of noble power was fatally weakened, and the nobility appeared tamed.

In fact, however, it was only suppressed. By the end of the “grand siècle,” as Louis' powers weakened, the noble opposition grew stronger again, and this time its main weapon was provided by the monarchy and its devoted servants themselves: it was the concept of the “state” as the object of loyalty. Louis XIV identified with the state and saw his personal ambitions and self-image (his “glory”) as those of France. The aristocracy, however, no longer wished to see the king and the state as one. Rather, it was insistently interpreting the latter as the community of France, the French people and territory, as a *nation*.

The concept "nation," in its modern meaning, was imported from England, on which the attention of the French elite (aristocratic and intellectual—the incorporation of intellectuals into the aristocracy being one very important aspect of the redefinition of noble identity) was focused in the early eighteenth century. Several qualities recommended the English concept to the French. England was replacing France as the European superpower, and the example of its success, seen as related to the English nationalism and type of government, spurred the wish to imitate it. The nation, rather than the king, was believed to be the supreme object of loyalty and the bearer of sovereignty in England, the authority of the Crown was strictly limited by Parliament, and the aristocracy seemed to have retained its ancient political powers.

When the concept "nation" was first imported into France, it was seen as synonymous with the nobility.⁶ During the eighteenth century, the notion of a French nation gradually expanded. Still, until the Revolution, nationalism grew mostly out of the acute frustrations of the nobility that was in conflict with the King and had little to justify its high status with, other than the interests of France. Moreover, whether narrowly or broadly defined, the French nation inherited the qualities of the French state. It was seen as an abstract entity, unitary, indivisible, and necessarily authoritarian. "The Nation exists before everything, it is the source of everything," preached Sieyès in *Qu'est ce que le tiers état* (Sieyès 1982). "All sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. No body, no individual can exercise authority which does not explicitly emanate from it," read article 3 of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* (1789). The nation had only one will which was not identical with the will of the majority, and could be divined and interpreted by a natural elite of virtue and intelligence. (This lofty role was first claimed by the traditional aristocracy, but during the Revolution was wrung from it by those denied entry into its ranks.)

The quintessential expression of the French idea of the nation on the eve of the Revolution is Rousseau's *Social Contract* (Rousseau 1952), even though Rousseau was not a French patriot, and the original terms, "Sovereign" and "general will," were only later (in the *Government of Poland*—Rousseau 1972) equated with the "nation" and the "will of the nation." The subject of the *Social Contract* is society as such. The contract is concluded by men when the preservation of the state of nature is no longer feasible, and society, or "civil state" (later "nation") is its product. The clauses of the social contract, says Rousseau, "may be reduced to one—the total alienation of each associate with all his rights, to the whole community... the alienation without reserve." As the personalities of the contracting parties dissolve,

at once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life, and its will.

“Each of us,” says Rousseau, “puts his person and his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will.” The exercise of general will is Sovereignty.

Society (or nation) is law unto itself. All values emanate from it, and it is, by definition, infallible: “the general will is always right.” There are no limitations on the power of this will. “[B]eing formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, [it] neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently, the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to hurt ... its members.” This eliminates the necessity—and the very concept—of human rights. As to those individuals who may find themselves in disagreement with the will of the nation, Rousseau rules: “whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing else than that he will be forced to be free.” While political liberty came to designate the unobstructed realization of the general will, “civil liberty” was defined as obedience to the general will. This will was to speak through “the legislator,” a special person with a “great soul” and intellect “above the range of the common herd,” and the elective aristocracy (which Rousseau too sometimes confused with the Nation as a whole)—thus modifying the concept of equality as well.

This collectivistic and authoritarian interpretation of the nation was reinforced by the changed sentiment toward England (partly accounted for by the defeat in the Seven Years' War), which soon acquired the form of *ressentiment* and inspired a transvaluation of the English values (Acomb 1950; Schama 1989). Clearly, in this case *ressentiment* encouraged the development of certain elements within the indigenous tradition (and attenuation of others), rather than created new ideas, but had it not fuelled the passions of many influential thinkers during those pregnant times, it is unlikely that these indigenous elements would become so central. There was enough of the Enlightenment's respect for the individual and fondness for rationality and law in France to counteract the influence of the “etatist” tradition and produce an English type of nationalism. *Ressentiment* toward England made this impossible at the time.

Because of the existence of the indigenous liberal tradition and, most importantly, because of the necessarily contradictory nature of civic (that is, in principle open and voluntaristic) and collectivistic nationalism, liberal democracy in France was not ruled out. But—as Tocqueville ([1856] 1955) recognized already in the middle of the nineteenth century—it could never exist uncontested and was never *on its own* able to endure for a long time. The general principle of popular sovereignty was never questioned in France after the Revolution: one of the very first nations, France is, by definition, a democracy. But the fate of *liberal* democracy in France—in contrast to its fate in England—has been dependent on the international situation: the weaker of the two traditions compatible with the definition of the French national identity, it needed support from without to survive.

Russia

In distinction to France, in the development of Russian nationalism—the first major example of the ethnic *type*—*ressentiment* played a crucial role, while the influence of indigenous traditions was negligible. The history of Russian nationalism began with the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725), who undertook to turn Russia into a European power, and effectively destroyed its indigenous traditions as a first step in this attempted Westernization. Peter's measures were thorough: hardly any aspect of the Russian life escaped his innovations. He reformed the Church and subjugated it to the secular authority of the tsars, changed the manner of dress, attempted to make Dutch the official language and, when this failed, inaugurated the creation of modern Russian, imported Western cuisine, forms of administrative and military organization, and concepts.

Such thoroughgoing revolution from above was possible in Russia, because the power of its rulers, since at least the 16th century, was truly absolute (Beloff 1953; Blum 1977; Meehan-Waters 1982). Russian autocracy was an absolutism unrivaled by any in the West. The upper stratum of the society Peter inherited, the nobility, was a service estate without independent sources of power and no territorial base. The rest consisted almost entirely of peasants, who were legally enserfed in 1649. The nobles were landowners with the right to the free labor of serfs, but their estates were theirs on condition of service to the autocrat.

The status of the nobility was precarious even before Peter's accession, but his reforms made its very identity psychologically untenable. Under Peter, on the one hand, personal status was tied to rank achieved in service, even noblemen of most exalted birth having to begin at the bottom of service hierarchy, and, on the other, ennoblement became automatic. Nobility as such was rendered meaningless. While noble birth necessarily bred high expectations and set young aristocrats apart from the rest, it was powerless to fulfill these expectations.

Unhappy with their present identity, the Russian nobility was ready to adopt a new one that would be commensurate with their sense of dignity. The framework for such new identity was provided by Peter himself, in the western concepts—of state, nation, and general good—that he imported. In his edicts he reinterpreted his own authority as the authority of the Russian *state*, insisted that service was due not to himself personally, but to the *fatherland*, presented Russia as a proud *nation*, rather than his patrimony, and talked of the interests of the Russian *people*.

It took several generations for these concepts (which required a creation of an entirely new vocabulary) to enter the general educated (and ipso facto aristocratic) discourse. This happened during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762-1796). Like Peter, enamoured of western ideas, Catherine fostered among her subjects the “philosophical” spirit. Under her, the nobility completed the transition it had begun under Peter and turned nationalist (Dukes 1967; Rogger 1960).

Having exchanged its estate identity as nobles for the national identity and become Russians, the nobility was faced with a problem. Theoretically, nationality made all eligible to national membership equal and thus protected from the absolute loss of status and guaranteed everyone a modicum of dignity.

In practice, however, the psychological gratification to be derived from national identity in a nation which was a unique, rather than sovereign, people, depended on the status of this nation vis-à-vis other nations, or on national pride. But there was little to be proud of in Russia. For anyone who looked closely, Russia remained backward in almost every respect when compared to the West. (This comparison was inevitable, because the West was chosen by Peter—and upheld by his successors—as *the model*, and the Russian nationalists insisted that theirs was a European state.) Its masses were illiterate, its technology never quite up to the western standards, its governing institutions not really western because neither the nobility nor the towns had any political power, and—most conspicuously, the great majority of its own, national, population were slaves who could be bought and sold like cattle or inanimate objects.

The remarkable military successes of Peter the Great that led to the emergence of Russia as a formidable power in European politics, and his spectacular achievements at home, such as the creation of the city of St. Petersburg, led early nationalists to believe that the gap could be easily closed and to regard it as a challenge. But when, two generations later, these hopes failed to realize, the admiration of the West turned into *ressentiment*, and the West itself from the model turned into the antimodel.

Since, so far as the classes participating in this process were concerned, the indigenous traditions were destroyed, the Russian national consciousness was defined almost wholly on the basis of the transvaluation of the western values. The axis of the transvaluation was the rejection of *reason* (indeed the central Western value)—the faculty of the human mind that creates the individual. A famous Russian writer and one of the foremost eighteenth-century nationalists, Fonvisin, asked: “What is there to be proud of in having reason? Reason, if it is only reason, is a veritable trifle” (Fonvisin 1888). Instead of reason, the Russian nation was to be characterized by the enigmatic (and therefore, appropriately undefined, inscrutable) Slavic soul, which expressed itself in unexpected, spontaneous, irrational behavior, and the emphasis on feeling.

The rejection of reason implied the rejection of individual as an independent actor and of the political values of liberty and equality. While Russian nationalists agreed that the concepts denoted great moral virtues, they refused to see in Western institutions their true embodiment. Western liberty and equality, they ruled, were not *real* liberty and equality. The nature of the *real* thing remained, on the whole, unclear. Among the few attempts to define liberty and equality à *la Russe* was Derzhavin's poetic declaration that the Russian people sees “happiness—in unity/equality—in equity/and liberty—in the ability to control one's passions” (Derzhavin 1868).

The final step in the construction of Russian national consciousness was the discovery of “the people,” which determined the criteria of membership in the nation and led to its definition as an ethnic collectivity. The Russian patriots connected *reason*, which they rejected, to too much civilization, and the lack thereof (the Slavic soul)—to its opposite, the vital forces of nature—blood and soil. It was the “people”—the enserfed peasants—who were least contaminated by civilization and had nothing

but blood and soil to characterize them. Therefore, it was concluded, their Slavic soul—and their nationality—was the purest. A corollary of this conclusion was that those who were not of this blood and soil could not possibly have the Russian soul—empirical evidence being considered inadequate—and thus could not be Russian.

Interestingly, serfdom for a long time was seen as entirely consistent with the view of the peasantry as the standard bearer of nationality. Suffering and humiliation of the peasantry seemed to promote the development of the Slavic soul and soon became themselves considered its distinctive qualities. The idea that all men were created equal and that among their inalienable rights was some such thing as the pursuit of happiness, was in this context, to put it mildly, foreign.

The ingredients of the Russian national consciousness, and the definition of the Russian nation, were already present by 1800. The Russian national idea consisted in the following: The nation was defined as a collective individual formed by ethnic, primordial factors such as blood and soil and characterized by the enigmatic soul, or spirit. The spirit of the nation resided in the “people,” but—paradoxically, though not unexpectedly—revealed itself through the medium of the educated elite; the rejection of the common individual, which, as in other cases, expressed itself in the glorification of the community, also led to the emphasis on special, uncommon individuals, and, as a result, the adoration of the “people” frequently found its counterpart in elitism and the contempt for the masses. Russian nationalism was ethnic, collectivistic, and authoritarian.

This has been the nature of Russian national consciousness and identity until our day. Since the 1840s it was expressed in one of two alternating and apparently contradictory idioms: Westernism and Slavophilism. In fact, the two traditions, as their representatives admitted, were actually the two sides of one. Both defined the West as the anti-model and rejected its values (such as reason, liberty and equality), and both—though each in its own fashion—idealized Russia and predicted its triumph over the West. Westernism saw the fulfillment of the ideal (Russia as anti-West) in the future, following the destruction of the old world and beyond the present state of Western societies, but it still accepted the direction in which the West developed as the only way. Slavophiles, on the other hand, placed their ideal outside Western development and, in fact, outside history. For them the ideal was already fulfilled: the superiority of Russia over the West derived from that it was *not* a Western nation, but instead embodied the principle opposed to that on which Western civilization was based.

This (Russian) principle was “communism” literally speaking—the dissolution of the individual in community, and embodied the true aspiration of man (to use a Marxist term [Marx 1843], his *Gattungswesen*) and made possible the true freedom. Indeed, it is hard not to be reminded of Marx when one reads the following statement by a Slavophil Aksakov (Riasanovsky 1976):

A commune is a union of the people who have renounced their egoism, their individuality, and who express their common accord; ...in a commune the individual is not lost, but renounces his exclusiveness in favor of the general accord—and there arises the noble phenomenon of a harmonious, joint existence of rational beings (consciousness): there arises a brotherhood, a commune—a triumph of human spirit.

Freedom was the freedom to live this principle, and of course it had nothing to do with the outward world of politics. This enabled Slavophiles to accept, in fact uphold, the autocracy.

Having understood ... that freedom is only of the spirit, Russia continually stood up for her soul... she knew that perfection was impossible on earth, she did not seek earthly perfection, and therefore she chose the best (that is the least evil) form of government and held to it constantly without considering it perfect.

Russian Marxism was, of course a Westernist movement, for Slavophiles, by definition, would not take the lead from a German. But the reasons for the appeal of the doctrine to Russian Westernists would be acceptable to the Slavophiles: like Russian nationalist thought in general, Marxism rejected the values of the Western civilization (represented as *Capital*) and promised the triumph of the anti-West (the *Proletariat*). The identity between Russian national and Marxist aspirations was affirmed, among others, by Lenin, in the essay “On the national Pride of the Great Russians” (Lenin 1914). The Revolution and the victory of socialism, he declared, would finally allow Russia to outdo the West and assume its place at the helm of the Western nations.⁸

On the face of it, the assertion of Westernist nationalism in the Bolshevik Revolution created a paradoxical situation. An explicitly universalist ideology was put at the service of an ethnic national particularism. But in fact the internationalist aspect of the Marxist doctrine was very soon given up, and though communism became an expression of Russian national identity for many people, its adoption failed in the least to modify the character of Russian nationalism. The definition of the nation remained ethnic. The concept of the Soviet nation was never seriously advocated and never developed (the phrase itself sounds absurd in Russian, although there is Soviet state, land, and people); the Soviet Union is, emphatically, a union of nations. Racially-defined nationality, indicated in the “fifth point” in the passport of every Soviet citizen, rather than class origin, occupation or education, to the last defined the identity—and thus disposition?—of a person in the classless society.

If for the most of the twentieth century Russia remained true to its autocratic traditions, it is because its national identity, defined as ethnic and therefore incommensurable with liberal democracy, has not changed since 1800. The adoption of communism and the proletarian revolution failed to significantly modify its character. It remains to be seen whether the abandonment of communism and a “revolution from above” can do so. Russia's “transition to democracy” depends on

such redefinition of self to a far greater extent than on the introduction of certain procedures or even the success of an economic reform.

Democracy and nationalism are inherently linked and neither can be fully understood apart from this connection. The character of democracy in any particular society is defined by the character of its nationalism and can change only if the latter changes too. Such changes in collective identity do occur, but they occur extremely rarely and cannot be expected to happen simultaneously in numerous societies, even if affected by the same change of the international conditions. The fact that “democratic revolutions” of the recent years have been in many cases accompanied by the resurgence of nationalism, often in respectively traditional forms, should serve to us as a warning. Nationalism, and specifically ethnic nationalism antithetical to liberal democracy, is not dead but is as vigorous as ever. It is too early to proclaim the end of history and the establishment of a new world order. A realistic assessment of the situation must take nationalism in every specific case—and its implications for democracy—into consideration. The nature of a collective identity cannot tell us which of the propensities or potentialities of the collectivity will be realized, but it can tell us which potentialities exist, and thus is an excellent basis for deciding which scenarios are unlikely.

NOTES

1. Among some 187 nations of the world (the number is constantly changing) only 10 have the word "democratic" in their official names: Algeria, Ethiopia, Fiji, North Korea, Laos, Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and possibly Greece, the official name of which in Greek is "Elliniki Dimokratia," but which is translated as "Hellenic Republic."

2. The discussion of nationalism here is based on *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Harvard University Press, 1992)—a comparative historical study of the emergence of national identity and its early development in the first five major societies to define themselves as nations: England, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States. The argument of the book differs from the previous theories of nationalism (for instance Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986) in several respects, among them the attention to the differences within nationalism (the previous theories treat it as a uniform phenomenon) and the view of the relationship between nationalism and various aspects of modernization. A brief discussion and evaluation of these theories, and the reasons for diverging from them, may be found in Greenfeld (1991).

3. In some cases, ethnicity may be defined in terms of, or include, race. For the definition of ethnicity, I use Glazer and Moynihan (1975).

4. I use this concept in the sense it was originally defined by Durkheim in *The Division of Labor in Society* (1964) and in *Suicide* (1969), and later developed by Merton in "Social Structure and Anomie" (1938), as denoting structural inconsistency, and specifically, the inconsistency between values and other elements of social structure.

5. Greenfeld (1991, 1992) discusses the development of English national identity in greater detail. For historical accounts one should also see Kohn (1940, 1944), and Newman (1987). In general, English nationalism has not been the focus of much scholarly attention.

6. For expressions of the equation of the nation with the nobility see Boulainvilliers (1732), and Montesquieu (1945).

7. A detailed discussion of the development and character of Russian nationalism is found in Greenfeld (1990, 1992). The most comprehensive historical treatment of the subject is Rogger (1960).

8. Perhaps even stronger was this identity in the mind of Stalin; this is the thesis of the recent book by Tucker (1990).

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